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Survey
Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): A First
Circuit Survey and Review
Tory Weigand*

The interlocutory appeal is the rare exception and is generally
disdained by a system rooted to the final judgment rule.1 Like all
* Mr. Weigand is a partner in the Boston and Springfield Offices of Morrison
Mahoney LLP. He is a trial and appellate attorney with a focus in
commercial and professional liability.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“the courts of appeal . . . shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States”). Federal judicial policy against piecemeal jurisdiction dates
back to the First Judiciary Act of 1791. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 21,
22, 25, 1 Stat. 83–86; Alexandra Hess, Stephanie Parker & Tala Tounian,
Permissive Interlocutory Appeals at The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995–2010), 60 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 758 n.1
(2011); see also Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by
Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 726–29
(1993) (tracing the development of the final-judgment rule); Darr v.
Muratore, 8 F.3d 854, 862 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing the circuit’s usual
prohibition against piecemeal appellate review in context of Rule 54(b));
Cummins v. EG&G Sealol Inc., 697 F. Supp. 64, 67 (D.R.I. 1988) (explaining
that federal law “abhors piecemeal disputing interlocutory district court
orders”); Sierra Club v. March, 907 F.2d 210, 212 (1st Cir. 1990) (as a general
rule, “it has been a marked characteristic of the federal judicial system not to
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184 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:183
exceptions to the finality rule, it is intended to solve instances
where too rigid an adherence to the finality requirement would
cause a severe hardship and injustice with a particular litigant. It
reflects a value judgment as to where to draw the line between the
competing policy choices of systemic efficiency, inconvenience and
cost of piecemeal litigation, and the inefficiencies and hardship of
denying justice through delay. 2
The general interlocutory appeal exception is codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). Purely discretionary, it has been described as
“[t]he most explicitly flexible provision for interlocutory appeals.”3
This bifurcated discretionary approach, requiring permission of
both the district court and court of appeals through application of
specific statutory criteria, is unique in that it grants appellate
gatekeeper status upon the trial court.4 The discretionary
approach provides a flexible, 5 individualized approach and
balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis.6 It allows for the
selection of those cases worthy of immediate review in order to
correct errors in the lower court or develop law, while allowing

permit an appeal until a litigation has been concluded in the court of first
instance” (quoting Director, O.W.C.P. v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 853 F.2d 11,
13 (1st Cir. 1988)).
2. Andrew Pollis, The Need For Non-Discretionary Interlocutory
Appellate Review in Multi-District Litigation, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1649
(2011) (noting that all of the exceptions to the final judgment rule reflect
value judgment as to where to draw the line between “the interests of an
aggrieved party in the prompt resolution of particular claims of error [and]
the systemic interest that militate in favor of requiring the party to wait until
the end of the case to seek appellate vindication.”); see also Gillespie v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152–53 (1964) (explaining that finality rule
requires the balancing of the competing considerations of “’the inconvenience
and costs of piecemeal appeal review on the one hand and the danger of
denying justice by delay on the other’” (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum
Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)).
3. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§3929, 430 (2d. ed. 1996) [hereinafter WRIGHT ET AL].
4. See Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995)
(“Congress thus chose to confer on district courts first line discretion to allow
interlocutory appeals.”).
5. See Cummins, 697 F. Supp. at 68 (stating that “the purpose of
1292(b) is to give the judiciary flexibility in ameliorating the sometimes
harsh effects of the final judgment rule.”).
6. Martineau, supra note 1, at 777 (explaining that the discretionary
approach provides for “an individualized balancing of interests made on a
case by case basis.”).
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the court system to control the amount its of workload.7 The
approach has its critics. They complain that the discretionary
approach results in “procedural unpredictability and substantive
uncertainty” 8 and fosters a regime that “is too vulnerable to the
whims and prejudices of individual judges who deny discretionary
appeals in cases they wish to avoid.” 9 There is a concern that the
statute is under-utilized, 10 unduly limited to “exceptional
case[s]” 11 or to large complex cases, and otherwise hobbled by
allowing trial judges, with unreviewable discretion and “vested
interests,” to serve as gatekeepers of appellate review. 12
7. Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review
of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 230–31.
8. Pollis, supra note 2, at 1663. For discussion of the debate between
having exceptions to the finality rule for purposes of interlocutory appeal
based on narrowly defined categories and discretion, see Pollis supra note 2,
at 1651 (discussing the category vs. discretionary approaches to permissible
interlocutory appeals); Glynn, supra note 7 at 259–62 (advocating for
categorical approach). See also James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarrek
Krohn, Interlocutory Review By Agreement of the Parties: A Preliminary
Analysis (Nw. U. Sch. of L. Scholarly Commons Faculty Working Papers,
Paper No. 101, 2010), available at http://cholarlycommons.law.northwestern.
edufacultyworkingpapers/101/ (advocating approach to interlocutory appeal
that combines the discretionary and categorical approaches and empowers
court to certify for interlocutory appeal when the parties to the litigation so
agree).
9. Pollis, supra note 2, at 1662.
10. Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the
Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1193 (1990).
11. See Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 263 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1959); H.R.
Rep. No. 85-1667, at 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.A.N.N. 5255, 5260
(“Your Committee is of the view that the appeal from interlocutory orders
thus provided should and will be used only in exceptional cases. . .”); see also
Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders: A Guided Tour
Through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE L.J. 333, 340–41
(1959) [hereinafter Discretionary Appeals] (“While the use of the phrase
‘exceptional cases’ in the legislative history suggests the statute applies only
to the ‘big’ case, emphasis was also given to 1292(b)’s ameliorating effect on
district court backlogs, a result obtainable only if the new section is more
liberally employed.”).
12. MacKenzie Horton, Mandamus, Stop in The Name of Discretion: The
Judicial “Myth” of The District Court’s Absolute and Unreviewable Discretion
in Section 1292(b) Certification, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 976, 982 (2013)
(explaining that “Section 1292(b)’s initial gatekeeper wields considerable
power with little institutionalized constraint.”); Pollis, supra note 2, at 1661
(noting district courts’ vested interest in preventing reversal); see also Glynn,
supra note 7 at 245 (explaining that under Section 1292(b) district court
decisions are “subjective and unchecked by formal or informal constraints in
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This survey sets forth the governing substantive and
procedural principles applicable to Section 1292(b), with a
particular focus on the decisions and the precedents of the First
Circuit since the statute’s adoption in 1958. It sets out a review of
available First Circuit appellate and district court decisions
during the last fifty-five years. It attempts to explore the judicial
application of the statutory discretion by both the district courts
and the First Circuit Court of Appeals. It attempts to explore
what conclusions, if any, that can be drawn as to the frequency,
usefulness and practical applications of the dual discretion system
both under the statute and the competing interests of efficiency
and justice.
I.

INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1292

Section 1292 constitutes the gradual codification of various
exceptions to the final judgment rule that evolved and were
adopted by Congress between 1891 and 1992. 13 In 1891, Congress
enacted the Judiciary Act of 1891 (known as the “Evarts Act”)
which included a provision providing for review of orders granting
or continuing injunctions even if there was no final judgment. 14
a pure discretionary regime.”); Pollis, supra note 2, at 179–80 (contending
that discretionary review “will not result in dramatic increases in the
correction of errors that threaten to inflict irreparable harm nor enhance
significantly the development of legal standards to areas that have
traditionally evaded appellate review.”); see also Horton, supra at 981–82
(explaining that § 1292(b)’s discretion “protects the district court’s
understandable reluctance to undergo early appellate review” and “‘vastly
reduces its effectiveness as a safety valve from the rigors of final judgment
rule’”(quoting Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in
the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 108–09 (1975)).
13. Hess et al., supra note 1 at 760. See Tidewater Oil Co. v. U.S., 409
U.S. 151, 162–63 (1972) (explaining that Section 1292(b) is “a consolidation of
a number of previously separate code provision including the general
interlocutory appeal provision”); see also Solimine, supra note 10, at 1172
(discussing the legislative compromise behind Section 1292(b) that resulted
in the “dual certification” requirement). There are four primary avenues for
appellate review of interlocutory orders in federal court: (1) certification of
judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the
collateral order doctrine; (3) discretionary certification under 28 U.S.C. §
1292; and (4) a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act, codified as 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). Id.
14. Hess et al., supra note 1, at 769 (citing Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517,
§7, 26 Stat. 826, 828); United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F.2d 662, 666
(1st Cir. 1969) (noting that Section 7 of the Evarts Act provided for review of
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This was expanded four years later when orders refusing
injunctions were added.15 This is a prolific source of appeals and
likely accounts for the largest number of interlocutory appeals.
Interlocutory review of orders pertaining to receivers, admiralty,
and patent cases followed in 1900, 1926, and 1927 respectively.16
The Supreme Court has remarked that these exceptions to the
final judgment rule arose from the belief that litigants should be
able to “effectively challenge interlocutory orders of serious,
perhaps irreparable, consequence.” 17
In 1958, The Interlocutory Appeals Act was adopted with the
majority of the previously recognized exceptions set forth in
Subsection 1292(a) of the act. Subsection 1292(b) was added to set
out “non-enumerated appeals of interlocutory orders.” 18 Later, in
1982 and 1992 respectively, the most recent additions to the
statute were made. Specifically, as a result of the 1982 Federal
Courts Improvement Act, 19 Subsections (c) and (d) were added,
interlocutory orders pertaining to injunctions).
15. See Act of Feb. 18, 1895, ch. 96, 28 Stat. 666, 666–67 codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012) (applying to orders “granting, continuing,
modifying or refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions.”).
16. Orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships is
set forth in Section 1292(a)(2). This section applies to orders “appointing
receivers or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to
accomplish this purpose such as directing sales or other disposals of property.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012). Orders or decrees in admiralty cases are set
forth in Section 1292(a)(3), which provides for interlocutory appeal of decrees
“determining the rights and liability of the parties to admiralty cases in
which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). See
also Tidewater Oil Co., 409 U.S. at 151 (“[Subsection (b) of this section] was
intended to establish jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to review
interlocutory orders, other than those specified in [subsection (a) of this
section], in civil cases in which they would have jurisdiction were the
judgments final.”).
17. Baltimore Contractors Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955)
(stating that “[w]hen the pressure rises to a point that influences Congress,
legislative remedies are enacted.”).
18. Hess et al., supra note 1, at 761. The most recent addition to Section
1292 is Section 1292(e), adopted in 1992. At that time and at the suggestion
of the Federal Courts Study Committee, Congress enacted Section 1292(e),
authorizing the Supreme Court to issue rules that expand the set of allowable
interlocutory appeals. In 1998, the Supreme Court promulgated Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(f) pursuant to this authority. Asher v. Baxter Intern., Inc., 505 F.3d
736, 741 (7th Cir. 2007).
19. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127,
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establishing that the Federal Circuit had exclusive interlocutory
jurisdiction over certain specialized courts such as the United
States Court of Claims and the United States Court of
International Trade. 20 In 1992, Subsection (e) was added as a
part of the Federal Courts Administration Act, 21 permitting the
Supreme Court to allow interlocutory appeals in other instances
not provided for elsewhere in Section 1292. In effect, Rule 23(f) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, addressing orders pertaining
to certification of class actions, is the only interlocutory appeal
provision that has resulted since the enactment of Subsection
(e). 22
Section 1292(b) has been described as the “greatest legislative
compromise . . . on the policy of finality that has marked the
history of the court of appeals.” 23 It was “a judge-sought, judge
made, judicial sponsored enactment” 24 as it was devised and
introduced by the Judicial Conference of the United States, 25
which was comprised of federal judges.26 The original proposal,
96 Stat. 25, 37–39 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)–(d) (2012)).
20. The Federal Circuit court was provided the same dual discretionary
approach set out in sub-section (b).
21. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §
101, 106 Stat. 4506, 4506 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)).
22. Rule 23(f) provides that the court of appeals “may permit”
interlocutory review of an order granting or denying class-action certification.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). Notably, the discretion is described in the Committee
Notes as “unfettered” and does not require “certification” by the district court.
Other exceptions to the final judgment rule permitting interlocutory appeal
include: the right to appeal from orders that refuse to enforce contractual
arbitration clauses enacted in 1988, 9 U.S.C. 16(a) (2012), the collateral order
doctrine, writs of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012), and
bankruptcy orders enacted in 1984. 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (2012).
23. THOMAS BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS
OF APPEALS 57 (2d. ed 2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/primjur2.pdf/$file/primjur2.pdf.
24. Hadjipateras v. Pacifica S.A., 290 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1961).
25. The Judicial Conference of the United States dates back to 1922.
Originally called “The Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,” it was created to
serve as the principal policy making body concerned with the administration
of the U.S. Courts. District Court judges were formally added to the
Conference in 1957. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
26. The Senate Report on the bill that became Section 1292(b) stated:
This legislation results from a considerable study by committee of
the Judicial Conference. The legislation itself was introduced at the
request of the Administrative Office of the United States pursuant to
the direction of the Judicial Conference of the Unites States….The

WEIGANDFINALWORD[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/2/2014 1:24 PM

DISCRETIONARY INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

189

which was rejected, would have left the right to appeal an
interlocutory order at the discretion of the appellate courts. 27
However, legislators believed it was indispensable to have the
district courts involved given its superior familiarity with the
litigation. According to the House Report accompanying the
proposed legislation:
Only the Trial Court can be fully informed of the nature
of the case and the peculiarities which make it
appropriate to interlocutory review at the time
desirability of the appeal must be determined; and he is
probably the only person able to forecast the future
course of the litigation with any degree of accuracy. 28
The Supreme Court has since stated that the requirement of
the consent of the district court judge “serves the dual purpose of
ensuring that such review will be confined to appropriate cases
and avoiding time-consuming jurisdictional determinations in the
court of appeals.” 29
Section 1292(b) presently remains almost identical to its
wording when originally adopted. Unlike interlocutory appeals
sought under Section 1292(a) pertaining to injunctions, receivers
and receiverships, and admiralty decrees, which can be taken as
matter of right, Section 1292(b) is discretionary. 30 Section 1292(b)
bill results from a growing awareness of the need for expedition of
cases pending before the district court . . . The committee believes
that this legislation constitutes a desirable addition to existing
authority to appeal from interlocutory orders of the district
courts..Any legislation, therefore, appropriately safeguarded, which
might aid in the disposition of case before the district courts..by
saving useless expenditure of court time as to require the
approbation of all those directly concerned with the administration
of justice in the United States.
S. Rep. No. 85-2434, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5256-57).
27. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3929, at 438–39; see also Swint v.
Chambers Cnty. Com’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995).
28. H.R. Rep. No. 85-1667, at 5–6 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.A.N.N.
5255, 5262.
29. Coopers & Lyband v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978); see also
Swint, 514 U.S. at 47 (explaining that “[c]ongress thus chose to confer on
district courts first line discretion to allow interlocutory appeals.”).
30. Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 263 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1959); see also
Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that
interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b) is by permission while
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provides:
When a district judge, in making a civil action an order
not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of
the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing
in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have
jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in
its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the
entry of the order: provided, however, that application for
an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the Court of
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order. 31
The First Circuit stated early on that “[b]ecause of the general
policy against piecemeal appeals, statutes [like Section 1292]
permitting interlocutory appeals are to be construed with some
strictness” 32 as well as that “Section 1292 presents a
Congressional judgment that some interlocutory orders are of such
significance that appellate review is necessary in order to prevent
irreparable harm to an unsuccessful litigant.” 33 It has otherwise
proceeded to describe 1292(b) appeals as “hen’s teeth rare.” 34
Section 1292(b), by its very terms, does not apply to all types
of cases. For example the statute does not apply to appeals of
interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(a) is by right).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
32. Switz. Cheese Ass’n, Inc. v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 351 F.2d 552, 553
(1st Cir. 1965).
33. United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F.2d 662, 664 (1st Cir. 1969);
see also Hess, supra note 1, at 762 (noting that Section 1292(b) was intended
to strike a balance between the perceived need to “promote judicial efficiency
and the concern about ‘opening the door to frivolous, dilatory, or harassing
interlocutory appeals.’” (quoting Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 610 n.15 (1975)).
34. Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 573 (1st Cir. 2004); see
also Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing
Camacho’s “hen’s teeth rare” admonition and stating that “after twenty-four
years as a District Judge within this Circuit, I cannot recall an occasion in
which I have been willing to make a § 1292(b) certification.”).
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orders in criminal cases. 35 However, the statute does apply to
grand jury proceedings 36 as they are a “hybrid” matter 37 with true
criminal proceedings not otherwise formally arising “until a
formal charge is openly made against the accused.” 38 Section
1292(b) includes any orders relative to grand jury proceedings
including orders as to the adequacy of the evidence submitted in
support of an indictment. 39 Section 1292(b) can also reach any
order in a criminal action that is essentially civil in nature such as
an order pertaining to the return of monies deposited in a court
registry. 40 In a recent case, the issue arose as to whether an order
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 granting a defendant a new sentencing
hearing was “civil” for purposes of § 1292(b). 41 The court noted
that whether a Section 2255 proceeding is a civil action for
purposes of Section 1292(b) was “a challenging question.” 42 It
proceeded to avoid the issue finding the Section 1292(b) criteria to
have been met but leaving it to the First Circuit to decide the
issue of whether Section 2255 was a civil proceeding for purposes
of Section 1292(b).43
Section 1292(b) does not apply to orders that would otherwise
35. United States v. Pace, 201 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Selby, 476 F.2d 965, 967 (2d Cir. 1973).
36. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 580 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1978); see
also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 573 F.3d 936, 940 (6th Cir. 1978)
(subpoena upon witness to testify in grand jury does not invlve a witness in a
criminal proceeding and § 1292(b) applies).
37. Bonnell v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 1091, 1092–93 (D. Minn.
1979) (holding that grand jury proceedings are “hybrid” civil and criminal
proceedings and fall within “civil action” intention of § 1292(b)).
38. Post v. United States, 161 U.S. 583, 587 (1896).
39. United States v. Rivera-Mercado, 683 F. Supp. 2d 168, 170–71
(D.P.R. 2010).
40. United States v. Beach, 113 F.3d 188, 189 n.3 (11th Cir. 1987).
41. United States v. Sampson, No. 01-10384-MLW, 2012 WL 1633296, at
*1 (D. Mass. May 10, 2012).
42. Id. at *10; see also Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 352 n.3
(1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that “motions under § 2255 have often been
construed as civil actions much like habeas corpus proceedings.”); Wall v.
Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1289 n.7 (2011) (explaining that “there has been some
confusion whether § 2255 proceedings are civil or criminal”).
43. Sampson, 2012 WL 1633296 at *11. For cases allowing § 1292(b)
appeals in § 2255 proceedings see United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202
(3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Barron, 127 F.3d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1997),
rev’d on other grounds in rehearing en banc, 172 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
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qualify for interlocutory review such as an injunction or a final but
partial judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. It likewise applies only to “district court” judges and
has thus been held inapplicable to tax 44 and bankruptcy 45 courts
although available if the district court acts on a bankruptcy
matter. 46 Additionally, it has been held applicable to habeas
corpus petitions.47
As to magistrates, courts draw a distinction to determine
whether Section 1292 applies to their decisions depending on how
the case was referenced. The application of Section 1292 depends
on whether: (1) the reference to the magistrate is by agreement
and resulting plenary jurisdiction with the magistrate (28 U.S.C. §
636(c)(1)); (2) the more limited reference for purposes of nondispositive pre-trial matters; or (3) recommendations on
dispositive motions (28 U.S.C. §636(b)). 48 Where the parties have
consented for the magistrate to conduct all proceedings under
Section 636(c), certification under Section 1292 is permissible;
otherwise, the magistrate has no jurisdictional power to do so.49

44. The Tax Court has its own interlocutory appeals provision codified at
26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(2) (2012).
45. See Shapiro v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 632 F.2d 170, 171 (2d
Cir. 1980) (explaining that Section 1292(b) applies only to district court
judges); see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 252–55 (1992)
(explaining that § 1292(b) applies to district court judges sitting in
bankruptcy proceedings). In 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) was enacted providing
for interlocutory appeal for bankruptcy orders. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (2012).
There are no governing criteria set out in the statute with the majority of the
courts the criteria set out in Section 1292(b). See e.g., Ne. Sav., F.A. v.
Geremia, 191 B.R. 275, 278–79 (D.R.I. 1996); Fleet Data Processing Corp. v.
Branch, 218 B.R. 643, 654 n.21 (1st Cir. 1998).
46. Chorney v. Eastland Bank, No. 92-1782, 1993 WL 29088, at *2 (1st
Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (noting that district court found bankruptcy order at
issue “simple and easily disposed of on the merits” thus defeating any
appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(b)).
47. See Rogers, 180 F.3d at 352 n.3.
48. Cent. Soya Co. Inc. v. Voktas, Inc., 661 F.2d 78, 80 (7th Cir. 1981)
(holding that the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979 was sufficiently broad to
include Section 1292(b) certification); see also Vitols v. Citizens Banking Co.,
984 F.2d 168, 169–70 (6th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a “magistrate judge,
acting pursuant to a reference under § 636(b)(1) or (3), has no authority to
issue a dispositive ruling on a motion to certify a district court order for
interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b).”); Le Vick v. Skaggs Co., Inc., 701 F.2d
777, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
49. Cent. Soya Co., Inc., 661 F.2d at 78; Le Vick, 701 F.2d at 778 n.1.
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II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

The discerning feature of the discretionary provision of
Section 1292(b) is that it requires dual review. 50 Both the
appellate court and the trial court must approve an order for
interlocutory review. A party seeking review of an interlocutory
order must first obtain a certification from the district court and
then obtain leave from the appeals court to pursue the review of
the certified interlocutory order.
District Court. The request to certify before the district court
is either made at the time of the initial decision or made through a
motion to certify and amend the order. There is no prescribed
time limit to seek certification from the district court. Some
courts note that a delay in doing so mitigates against certification.
Indeed, at least two district court decisions within the First
Circuit have denied a motion for certification where it was filed
several months after the order was issued.51 However, others note
the need for “flexibility” because “[t]he wisdom of certification may
extend in unexpected directions and that what is most important
50. Heddendorf, 263 F.2d at 888 (explaining that “It is to be seen that
this amendment requires judicial action both by the district court and by the
court of appeals before a prospective appellant will be allowed to proceed with
an appeal from an interlocutory decision not otherwise appealable under §
1292”). The American Bar Association has previously endorsed an approach
to interlocutory appeals that give on the appellate court discretion to hear
non-final orders. The ABA approach would allow for such an appeal if it
would “(a) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify
further proceedings in the litigation; (b) Protect the petitioner from
substantial or irreparable injury; or (c) Clarify an issue of general importance
in the administration of justice.” James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarrek
Krohn, Interlocutory Review By Agreement of the Parties: A Preliminary
Analysis 9 n.23 (Nw. U. Sch. of L. Scholarly Commons Faculty Working
Papers, Paper No. 101, 2010), available at http://scholarlycommons.
law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/101/ (citing ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS (1994). The ABA approach differs from
Section 1292(b) in three ways. First, it sets forth disjunctive requirements;
that is, interlocutory review can be granted if any individual factor is
satisfied. Second, it includes a broad factor relating to “irreparable harm.”
Third, it does not require the district court to certify the appeal, granting all
discretion with the appellate court. Id.
51. Scanlon v. M.V. Super Servant 3, 429 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2005)
(district court denied as untimely motion to amend to certify an interlocutory
appeal filed more than four months after order issued); Hypertherm, Inc. v.
Am. Torch Tip Co., No. 05-373, 2008 WL 1767062, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 15,
2008) (denied as five months after order issued).
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is the soundness of the certification at the time it is made, not an
inquest into the comparative desirability of a vanished
opportunity for earlier appeal.” 52
While the district court must certify an order for immediate
appeal before the court of appeals has discretion to accept
jurisdiction under Subsection 1292(b), 53 Appellate Rule 5(a)(3)
provides that the district court can amend the underlying order to
include the certifying statement. 54 If the district court does
amend the order, the time to petition for appeal runs from the
entry of the amended order.55 This allows the district court some
flexibility in assessing the certification criteria and deferring a
ruling until there is needed record development or the resolution
of other issues.
The failure to take an authorized interlocutory appeal does
not preclude including the issue in any subsequent appeal from
the final judgment. 56 Some care is required as there is authority
that the failure to include a crucial or central issue in the Section
1292(b) certification will bar its review on final judgment appeal.57
Moreover, a certification denial under Section 1292(b) does not
preclude use or reliance on the collateral order doctrine 58 or, at
52. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3929, at 464–65. The statute
originally included that certification could be sought at “anytime” but this
was removed by amendment. For courts finding an unreasonable delay in
seeking certification as a basis for denial, see Richardson Elecs., Ltd. v.
Panache Broad. of Pa., Inc., 202 F.3d 957, 958–59 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating
that “a district judge should not grant an inexcusable dilatory request”). See
also Weir v. Propst, 915 F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding abuse of
discretion when district court allowed motion to amend interlocutory order
three months after the order was entered and no showing of any reason for
delay).
53. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978); Pride
Shipping Corp. v. Tafu Lumber Co., 898 F.2d 1404, 1406 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding no appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(b) where district court refused
to certify order); Rivera-Jimenz v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2004).
But see Hewitt v. Joyce Beverages of Wis., Inc., 721 F.2d 625, 627 n.1 (7th
Cir. 1983) (noting that in rare instances the appeals court may treat a case as
interlocutory appeal even though district court never entered certification).
54. FED. R. APP. PROC. 5(a)(3) (2009).
55. Id.
56. Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir. 1978).
57. Sheeran v. Gen. Elec. Co., 593 F.2d 93, 97–98 (9th Cir. 1979).
58. Rodriquez v. Banco Cent., 790 F.2d 172, 176 n.8 (1st Cir. 1986). See
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (creating the
collateral loan doctrine by establishing that orders, which “finally determine
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least potentially, a writ of mandamus. Indeed, a potential
interesting use of Section 1292(b) is to expand a collateral order
appeal such as seeking to add a precise issue with a ruling on
qualified immunity entitled to interlocutory appeal as of right.
As to mandamus, the First Circuit has made clear on at least
two occasions that there is “a heavy burden on one who seeks
mandamus on matters that come within the possible ambit of
[Section 1292(b)].” 59 According to the court, mandamus “is not a
substitute for interlocutory appeal for parties attacking the court’s
jurisdiction; it is appropriate only when the lower court is clearly
without jurisdiction and the party seeking the writ has no
adequate remedy to appeal.” 60 Since Section 1292(b) is a potential
appellate remedy, a prerequisite for review by mandamus is not
met. Indeed, a number of courts have held that the denial of
certification by the district court is not reviewable. 61
The
rationale is that to allow mandamus as to Section 1292(b)
certification denials would result in an end around the dual
gatekeeper structure of Section 1292(b). 62 Even in a case where a
party seeking a writ of mandamus did not request certification
under Section 1292(b), the First Circuit still denied such use, as

claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated” are appealable).
59. In re GAF Corp., 416 F.2d 1252, 1252 (1st Cir. 1969) (per curiam);
Boreri v. Fiat S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1983).
60. Boreri, 763 F.2d at 26 (quoting United States v. Sorren, 605 F.2d
1211, 1215 (1st Cir. 1979).
61. United States v. 687.30 Acres of Land, 451 F.2d 667, 670 (8th Cir.
1971) (finding no jurisdiction to review). See also discussion infra. Compare
Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 698 (9th Cir.
1977) (holding that issuing a writ of “mandamus to direct the district judge to
exercise his discretion to certify [a] question is not an appropriate remedy”);
and In re Phillips Petroleum Co., 943 F.2d 63, 67 (1991) (holding the Section
1292(b) petition was properly denied and to allow petition for mandamus
“would improperly utilize it as a substitute in the absence of any justifying
circumstances”) with In re McClelland Eng’rs, Inc., 742 F.2d 837, 837 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding on petition for writ of mandamus that there was abuse of
discretion in refusing to certify order under § 1292(b)); Ex parte Tokio Marine
& Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1963) (explaining that mandamus
to compel a district court to certify under Section 1292(b) “would indeed be
rare”).
62. See In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Section 1292(b) represents an alternative vehicle for review. 63
Some courts will allow the use of mandamus not to compel
Subsection 1292(b) certification but to seek appeal of the
underlying order being challenged. 64 While a writ of mandamus
has a substantially more strenuous standard of review, 65 it can be
pursued where the order is beyond the purview of Section 1292(b).
For example, 1292(b) does not apply where the issue does not
involve any substantial grounds for difference of opinion as to
controlling law66 or it would not materially advance termination of
the litigation.67 Another instance would include where seeking
Section 1292(b) certification would be deemed futile, such as when
a judge refuses to recuse herself. 68
However, Section 1292(b) is distinct from Rule 54(b) providing
for final and separate judgment which triggers the right of appeal.
For instance,
Rule 54(b) cannot be used to enter judgment on deciding
claims closely related to claims that remain, in an effort
to curtail the scope of appellate discretion as to
interlocutory appealability, [n]or should § 1292(b) be used
on final disposition of a separate matter when there is no
substantial ground for difference of opinion as to a
controlling question whose present disposition will
materially advance ultimate disposition of the case. 69
The First Circuit has agreed, noting the distinction between
Rule 54(b) and 1292(b) and stating that its discretion under
1292(b) should not be “evaded” by an inappropriate entry of
judgment under Rule 54(b) by the district court. 70
63. See In re GAF Corp., 416 F.2d at 1252.
64. Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d at 654; In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 449 (6th
Cir. 2005); see also Aaron S. Baayer, How Mandamus and Interlocutory
Appeals Interact, NAT’L L. J. (July 30, 2012).
65. Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d at 654.
66. See, e.g., Ohio Envtl. Council v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 565 F.2d 393, 398 (6th
Cir. 1977).
67. See, e.g., In re City of N.Y., 607 F.3d 923, 933 (2d Cir. 2010).
68. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 1992).
69. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3929, at 477–78.
70. Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
that interrelationship between an adjudicated and un-adjudicated claim
established that the district erred in entering judgment under Rule 54(b) and
noting that discretion of the appeals court to determine under 1292(b) cannot
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If the district court agrees to certify the order, the party has
ten days to file a petition with the appeals court. 71 The ten day
limit is jurisdictional and runs from the date the order is certified
or amended by the trial court 72 and cannot be extended by either
the district court or the court of appeals. 73 An appellant who
misses the ten-day certification period might consider applying for
recertification. However, the First Circuit has not squarely
addressed the issue of whether a district court may recertify an
order when it was initially dismissed as untimely following
certification. 74
The Supreme Court, in the dissenting opinion of Baldwin
County Welcome Center v. Brown, 75 addressed the merits of an
appeal involving a ruling on a 1292(b) certification where the
district court had recertified the issue nine months after the tenday period expired. Justice Stevens, in writing for the dissent,
noted a conflict among the courts and sided with the view
permitting such re-certifications.76 However, there are debates for
and against recertification. Those against recertification show
concern that permitting recertification effectively renders the tenday statutory period a nullity or may give the district court too
much discretionary power. Those for recertification argue for the
long-standing jurisdictional power of the district court to
reconsider any order.77
The individual Circuits vary on recertification practices. For
example, the First Circuit has, more than once, implied that
be so evaded).
71. See also FED. R. APP. P. 5(a)(3) (stating that if the district court
amends its order “to include the required permission or statement . . . the
time to petition runs from entry of the amended order”).
72. Rodriquez v. Banco Central, 917 F.2d 664, 668 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he
statute's ten-day limit is jurisdictional, which is to say that the law does not
permit us to forgive a party's failure to comply.”); In re Casal, 998 F.2d 28, 33
(1st Cir. 1993) (same).
73. In re Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 2002).
74. See Bush v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. (In re All Asbestos Cases), 849
F.2d 452, 453 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing initial appeal without prejudice to
re-filing following recertification).
75. 466 U.S. 147 (1984).
76. Id. at 162 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
77. Allowing recertification is consistent with the district court’s power
to enlarge the time to appeal as to appeals as of right under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5).
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recertification would be permissible.78 The Fifth Circuit has
adopted a lenient view that such recertification is freely
permissible, so long as the statutory criteria are still met at the
time of recertification. 79 The Sixth Circuit, however, follows the
rule that recertification only “extend[s] the jurisdictional period of
time which the petitioner had permitted to elapse” and cannot
bestow the appeals court with jurisdiction. 80 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit, while recognizing the general right to recertify,
requires the showing of excusable neglect and absence of
prejudice.81
Other circuits, most notably the Second, Seventh, and Ninth,
take a middle road in that they allow appellate jurisdiction over
the recertified 1292(b) order if “jurisdiction over the appeal would
serve judicial efficiency” and thus, “‘advance the purposes of
section 1292(b).’” 82 This includes consideration of the time
between the initial certification and the recertification, the reason
for the delay, and any prejudice. 83 According to the Second
Circuit, the focus of this inquiry “should be on ensuring that the
goal of Section 1292(b)—resolution of a controlling legal question
that could advance the ultimate termination of the litigation—will
still be satisfied by allowing an interlocutory appeal.” 84 The Third
Circuit has a similar but slightly different rule in that it permits
recertification when the appellant’s failure to timely file was
caused by a mistake of the court, rather than the party’s own
negligence. 85
78. Rodriquez v. Banco, 917 F.2d 664, 669 (1st Cir. 1990); In re La
Providencia Dev. Corp., 515 F.2d 94, 95–96 (1st Cir. 1975) (same).
79. Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. Woods v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 441 F.2d 407, 408 (7th Cir.
1971) (recertification six months after original certification did not give
appellate court jurisdiction).
81. Safety-Kleen, Inc v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 866–67 (4th Cir. 2001).
82. In re Benny, 812 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Nuclear
Engineering Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 247 (7th Cir. 1981)); Weir v. Propst,
915 F.2d 283, 286 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing in dicta the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits' approach as "controversial"); Marisol v. Giulani, 104 F.3d 524, 528
(2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the issue was a “close” one but that the Sixth
Circuit’s approach was “unnecessarily rigid” and adopting approach of the
Seventh and Ninth circuits.).
83. Marisol, 104 F.3d at 528.
84. Id.
85. Braden v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 955 (3d Cir. 1977) (en
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Circuit Court. Although Section 1292(b) refers to an
“application,” the submission to the circuit court for permission to
appeal is deemed a “petition.” 86 A notice of appeal cannot
substitute for the petition or otherwise confer appellate
jurisdiction.87
The petition must comply with Rule 32(c)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which governs the form of “other
papers.” Other rules that govern the petition are Rules 5(b) and
5(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pursuant to
Rules 5(b) and 5(c), the petition cannot exceed twenty pages 88 and
must contain the following:
(a) the facts necessary to understand the question
presented;
(b) the specific question presented;
(c) the relief sought;
(d) the reasons why the appeal should be allowed and is
authorized by statute or rule; and
(e) the copies of the underling order and district court
certification.
banc). Even among those courts that have found re-certification permissible,
there is a measure of disagreement over the governing standard. Baldwin
Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 162 (1984) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (noting conflict among the circuits). Compare Myles v. Laffitte,
881 F.2d 125, 126 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989) (recertification requires district court to
revisit such factors as delay caused by the untimely petition as well as
prejudice, excusable neglect and the statutory criteria) with In re City of
Memphis, 293 F.2d 345, 348–50 (5th Cir. 2002) (recertification appropriate
where mis-timing was due to inadvertent acts by the district court and court
reconsidered statutory criteria). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3929,
at 467 (“[T]he power to renew the certification should be used carefully to
prevent misuse of interlocutory appeals for the purpose of the effect of
harassing an adversary or fostering delay”); Marisol ex. rel. Forbes v.
Giuliani, 104 F.3d 524, 527–28 (2d Cir. 1996) (collecting cases).
86. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (“ . . . if application is made to [Court of
Appeals] within ten days after the entry of the order . . . ”) with FED. R. APP.
P. 5 (“petition for permission to appeal”).
87. See Aucoin v. Matador Servs., Inc., 749 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding that circuit lacked jurisdiction over Section 1292(b) appeal even
though party had filed a notice of appeal within ten days of certification).
88. The twenty-page limitation is exclusive of the certificate of
interested person or corporate disclosure statement, certificate of service and
attached district court order. FED. R. APP. P. 5(c).
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Any response or cross appeal is due within 10 days after
service of the petition.89
There is also a filing fee associated with the petition, but it is
not due until the circuit court grants permission to appeal. 90 The
appeal will be formally docketed after the fees are paid to the
district court clerk.91 A notice of appeal is not required and, once
docketed, the appeal is handled and processed as an ordinary
appeal. 92
If permission is granted, the review is not limited to the
issues specifically certified by the district court. The appellate
court can review “any question that is included within the order
that contains the controlling question of law identified by the
district court.” 93 “It is the order that is appealable, and not the
controlling question identified by the district court.” 94 It cannot,
however, otherwise go beyond the certified order 95 with some
authority finding exception, so long as there is substantial
intertwinement.96
III. SUBSTANTIVE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

In addition to the procedural requirements, a petitioner must
satisfy a stringent and difficult substantive basis for an
interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b). According to the First
Circuit, “the instances where Section 1292(b) may appropriately
be utilized will, realistically, be few and far between” 97 and is

89. FED. R. APP. P. 5(b)(2). Section 1292(b) specifically states that there
is no automatic stay of the trial court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (an
application for permissive appeal “shall not stay proceedings in the district
court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall
so order.”). A stay must be specifically requested, allowed, and entered by the
trial court.
90. FED. R. APP. P. 5(d).
91. FED. R. APP. P. 5(d)(3).
92. Id.
93. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 204–05 (1996).
94. J. MOORE & B. WARD, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 300, ¶110.25[1] (2d
ed. 1996).
95. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 205.
96. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3929, at 456 n.66 (citing Murray v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2009)).
97. In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1010
n.1 (1st Cir 1988) (quoting McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76, 76 n.1 (1st
Cir. 1984)).
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“hen’s teeth rare.” 98 The admonition is often repeated that
Section 1292(b) should be sparingly used “and only in exceptional
circumstances and where the proposed intermediate appeal
presents one or more difficult and pivotal questions of law not
settled by controlling authority.” 99 Indeed some courts have
stated that it should not be used in “ordinary litigation” but only
in protracted or long drawn out cases “such as anti-trust and
conspiracy cases.” 100 Nevertheless, it remains that both the
district courts and courts of appeals have separate discretion in
allowing interlocutory appeals.
IV.

DISTRICT COURT DISCRETION

Section 1292(b) “confers upon district courts first line
discretion to allow interlocutory appeals.” 101 This grant was
stated to have been “deliberately suggested and deliberately
adopted to secure an initial judgment on the desirability of appeal
by the trial judge as the person most familiar with the
litigation.” 102
Three criteria must be met in order for the district court to
certify an interlocutory order under Section 1292(b). The order or
98. Camacho v. Puerto Rico Port Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 573 (1st Cir.
2004).
99. See Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 263 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1959)
(quoting Kroch v. Texas Co., 167 F. Supp. 947, 949 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1958))
(Section 1292(b) “should be used sparingly and only in exceptional cases”); see
also McGillicuddy, 746 F.2d at 76 n.1; In re San Juan Dupont Plaza, 859
F.2d at 1010 n.1 (“[a]lthough the call is close, we believe the work product
issue in this matter to be sufficiently novel and important, and the
circumstances sufficiently out of the ordinary, as to fulfill the statutory
requisites. But we warn the parties and the district court that, in this case
and any others, we will hew carefully to the McGillicuddy line–for we
continue to believe that the instances where Section 1292(b) may
appropriately be utilized will, realistically, be few and far between”); Pacamor
Bearings, Inc. et al. v. Mineba Co. Ltd. et al., 918 F. Supp. 491, 514 (D.N.H.
1996) (explaining the same); Faigin v. Kelley, 923 F. Supp. 298, 299–300
(D.N.H. 1996) (explaining the same); and Camacho, 369 F.3d at 579
(explaining the same).
100. Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 64 (D.R.I. 1988)
(citing Fisons Limited v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1245 n.7 (7th Cir.
1972)); Milbert v. Bison Laboratories, 260 F.2d 431, 433–35 (3d Cir. 1958)
(citing House Report No. 1667, 85 Cong. 2d Sess., pp. 1, 2).
101. Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995).
102. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3929, at 439.
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ruling at issue must present: (1) a “controlling question of law,”
(2) over which there is a “substantial ground for difference of
opinion,” and (3) an immediate appeal will “materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation . . . .” Moreover, the
First Circuit has indicated that “[i]n applying these standards, the
court must weigh the asserted need for the proposed interlocutory
appeal with the policy in the ordinary case of discouraging
‘piecemeal appeals.’” 103 According to the Court:
Perhaps there is always some hardship caused by the
application of the ‘final decision’ rule. Yet the rule is
beneficial in most applications, because piecemeal
appeals would result in even greater hardships and
tremendous additional burdens on the courts and
litigants which would follow from allowing appeals from
interlocutory orders on issues that might later become
moot. The ‘discretion’ of the appellate court should be
exercised
in
the
light
of
this
fundamental
consideration. 104
A. Controlling Question of Law
To be a “controlling” question of law, the legislative history
suggests that the issue on appeal must be “serious to the conduct
of the litigation either practically or legally.” 105 This factor is
closely tied to the consideration of whether the grant of
certification may materially advance the termination of a case.106
The courts consider the saving of time and expense in determining
the “practical” component. 107 The First Circuit has likewise
103. Heddendorf, 263 F.2d at 889; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3930, at
488 (“The three factors should be viewed together as the statutory language
equivalent of a direction to consider the probable gains and losses of
immediate appeal.”).
104. Heddendorf, 263 F.2d at 889.
105. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing
Hearing on H.R. 6238, before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5256
(1958)).
106. See Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 108 F.R.D. 184, 188 (D.R.I. 1985)
(“[A] legal question cannot be controlling if litigation would be conducted in
much the same manner regardless of the disposition of the question upon
appeal.”).
107. Id. at 188–89; Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc.,
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referenced the terms “pivotal” and “important” as meeting the
“controlling” requirement and thus favoring certification and
permission to appeal. 108 The notion of “importance” would seem to
be viewed in terms of the litigation and the general substantive
area, the Circuit, and/or the public or potential future litigants.109
Similarly, the standard implicates the need for coherence,
uniformity, and predictability of the applicable law. 110
The “controlling question of law” element has two sub-parts:
the presentment of a pure question of law and that the legal
question be “controlling.” Courts have noted that a legal issue
suitable for interlocutory review under Section 1292(b) must pose
a “‘pure question of law’ rather than ‘merely . . . an issue that
might be free from a factual contest.’” 111 A question is deemed one
855 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D. Me. 1994) (holding that the controlling issue of law
element is met if interlocutory reversal might save time for the district court
and time and expense for the litigants).
108. See Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting the
“importance of the jurisdictional question and its unsettled nature”);
Springfield School Committee v. Banksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 262 (1st Cir. 1965)
(noting importance of the jurisdictional question); Lawson v. FMR LLC., 670
F.3d 61, 62 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting certified order “raised important questions
of first impression”); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Commonwealth of Mass., 971
F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that “in light of the pivotal importance
and broad commercial consequences of the question, we accepted
certification”); Torres v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 677 F.2d
167, 168 (1st Cir. 1982) (granting the 1292(b) certification due to the
“importance of the issue.”); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.,
859 F.2d 1007, 1010 (1st Cir 1988) (holding that the work product issue was
“sufficiently novel and important and the circumstances sufficiently out of
the ordinary to justify review under 1292(b)”); Lane v. First Nat. Bank of
Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 167 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that “because we agree that
the issue was ‘sufficiently novel and important’ we allowed the intermediate
appeal to proceed”); and S.G. v. American Red Cross, 938 F.2d 1494, 1495
(1st Cir. 1991) (noting the importance of jurisdiction issue).
109. See, e.g., Donahue v. R.I. Dep’t. of Mental health, 632 F. Supp. 1456,
1480–81 (D.R.I. 1986) (explaining that “when one considers the critical
importance of the statute, interlocutory review would surely redound to the
benefit of not only the parties but also citizenry”); Greenwood, 971 F. 2d at
821 (noting the “broad commercial consequences of the question”).
110. See Miara v. First Allmerica Fin. Life Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 68, 68 (D.
Mass. 2005) (explaining “this court awaits, as do members of the bar
practicing in this area, a definitive decision from the First Circuit to put to
rest any confusion in this area once and for all”).
111. United Airline Inc. v. Gregory, 716 F. Supp. 2d 79, 91 (D. Mass.
2010) (quoting Ahrenholtz v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Illinois, 219 F.3d 674, 676–
77 (8th Cir. 2000)).
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of law where it is “something the court of appeals [can] decide
quickly and cleanly, without reviewing the record.” 112
Accordingly, to any extent the issue requires reference or resort to
disputed facts or the record, it will likely doom the request for
interlocutory appeal.
Moreover, a distinction is needed between a case that
presents a question as to the legal significance of the facts and a
case that presents a factual dispute.113 For example, as set forth
in one recent case, the question of law found to be proper for
certification concerned the scope of Section 1292(b) itself, namely
whether a Section 2255 proceeding was a “civil action” for
purposes of Section 1292(b). 114 Further, the demarcation between
law and fact is not always easily determined. For instance,
federal preemption has been noted to constitute “the archetypal
example of an abstract legal issue” for purposes of Section
1292(b). 115 However, preemption often turns on factual issues. 116
It has been held that a legal question “usually does not
include matters within the jurisdiction of the trial court” such as
ruling on evidentiary matters.117 Matters of discretion with the
112. Ahrenholtz, 219 F.3d at 676–77.
113. See In re Text Messaging Anti-Trust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 624 (7th
Cir. 2010) (explaining the certification and permission to appeal concerning
uncertainty of Twombley pleading standard).
114. United States v. Sampson, Cr. No. 01–10384–MLW, 2012 WL
1633296, at *10 (D. Mass. May 10, 2012).
115. See Ahrenholz, 219 F.3d at 677; see also Philip Morris, Inc., v.
Harshbarger, 957 F. Supp. 327, 330 (holding that “preemption is an issue
naturally appropriate for interlocutory appeal”).
116. In United Airlines v. Gregory it was argued that the issue of federal
preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act did not pose a pure question
law of as it turned on whether or not the action or state law at issue refers to
an airline price or has a significant effect upon those prices which required
more facts and evidence. 716 F. Supp. 2d at 91. Judge Gorton rejected the
argument stating that “it cannot be the case that every ADA ruling is
inappropriate for interlocutory review simply because it involves the
‘significant effects’ test.” Id. See also Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d
380, 383 (5th Cir. 2004) (state regulation of leg room has significant effect on
airline prices); United Airlines v. Mesa, No. 97 C 4455, 1999 WL 1144962, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1999) (certifying for interlocutory review order regarding
whether regional airline’s were preempted by ADA as related to routes of air
carrier).
117. In re City of Memphis, 293 F.2d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 2002); see also
Lovejoy v. Town of Foxborough, No. Civ.A.00–11470–GAO, 2001 WL
1756750, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 2, 2001) (holding that “the determination to
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district court are also disfavored as to interlocutory review.118
This stems from the view that there is a minimal likelihood of
reversal and that appellate courts are loath to meddle with a trial
court’s discretionary province. Nonetheless, courts have otherwise
noted that “the key consideration is not whether the order
involves the exercise of discretion, but whether it truly implicates
the policies favoring interlocutory appeal.” 119
Certainly, a reversal of the district court’s ruling that would
either terminate the action or, at least, significantly alter or lessen
the scope of the case would be sufficient. 120 Section 1292(b) would
encompass issues whose resolution would “likely” have an effect
on the outcome. For instance, the First Circuit in Rodriquez v.
Banco Central deemed the accrual of a cause of action for statute
of limitations purposes to constitute a “controlling question of law”
even though other causes of action remained for trial. 121 Thus,
inherent to the controlling question of law criterion is timing in
that an issue may be controlling at one point of the litigation but
not another.122
B. Substantial Grounds For Difference of Opinion
Substantial grounds for difference of opinion arise when an
issue involves “one or more difficult and pivotal questions of law
not settled by controlling authority.” 123 When the difference of
opinion is substantial, there is usually significant uncertainty and

require submission of the answer for in camera inspection does not involve ‘a
controlling question of law’ as the statute provides, but rather a decision
about what weight to accord to the legitimate interests on both sides in order
to strike an appropriate balance under all circumstances”).
118. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1096 (5th Cir. 1970).
119. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir. 1974)
120. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 957 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.
Mass. 1997) (citing Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauaro, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d
Cir. 1990)) and Arizona v. Ideal Basic Indus., 673 F. 2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.
1982) (stating that all that must be shown in order for a question to be
controlling is that resolution of the issue on appeal could materially affect the
outcome of the litigation in the district court); Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 108
F.R.D. 184, 188 (D.R.I. 1995) (defining “controlling” to mean “serious to the
conduct of the litigation, either practically or legally”).
121. 917 F.2d 664, 664 (1st Cir. 1990).
122. Discretionary Appeals, supra note 11, at 619.
123. Phillip Morris, 957 F. Supp. at 330.

WEIGANDFINALWORD[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2014 1:24 PM

206 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:183
conflict presented in the case law, 124 “marked room for varying
opinion,” 125 confusion, 126 or a question of first impression.127
Some courts have noted that the “touchstone” of the substantial
ground prong is the likelihood of success on appeal.” 128 This has
been tempered by some courts to the extent that “the purpose of
the appeal is not to review the correctness of an interim ruling,
but rather to avoid harm to litigants or to avoid unnecessary or
repeated protracted proceedings.” 129 On the other hand, it has
also been observed that “the level of uncertainty required to find a
substantial ground for difference of opinion should be adjusted to
meet the importance of the question in the context of the specific
case” and that, as such, “in certain circumstances ‘certification
may be justified at a relatively low threshold of doubt.’” 130
124. Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 161, 182 (D. Mass. 2005)
(explaining that “case law to date demonstrates marked litigant confusion
and disagreement”); Canty v. Old Rochester Reg’l Sch. Dist., 54 F. Supp. 2d
66, 77 (D. Mass. 1999) (explaining that “the stark division among the six
circuits to consider Title IX preclusion of Section 1983 actions certainly
demonstrates sufficient difference of opinion”); Booten v. United States, 233
F. Supp. 2d 227, 228 (D. Mass. 2002) (explaining that statute did “not speak
clearly on the question [and] there is no binding precedent squarely on
point”); Rodriquez v. Banco, 917 F.2d 664, 665 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that
“[b]ecause the circuits are divided about the proper answer to this question,
and because the distric court has followed the minority view, we agreed to
answer this question”).
125. Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 555, 560 (D. Mass.
1995), rev’d on other grounds, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Barreras
Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 977 F. Supp. 545, 549 (D.P.R. 1997) (explaining that
“far from dubious, we view the preliminary retention of jurisdiction over the
Tobacco Institute as the only possible just action at this stage”).
126. Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 182, aff’d, 424 F.3d 43
(1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that “case law to date demonstrates marked
litigant confusion and disagreement”).
127. See Lawson v. FMR LLC., 670 F.3d 61, 62 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating
that the case “raised [an] important question of first impression”); Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 630 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1980) (same);
Indian Head Nat. Bank of Nashua v. Brunelle, 689 F.2d 245, 246 (1st Cir.
1982) (stating that “this precise issue has never been determined by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals”); United States v. Approximately 2,475,840 lbs of
Roasted Coffee Beans, 608 F. Supp. 288, 292 (D.P.R. 1985) (explaining that
the question is one of first impression).
128. United States ex rel. LaValley v. First Nat. Bank of Bos., No. 86-236WF, 1990 WL 112285, at *5 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing Berger v. United States,
170 F. Supp. 795, 796–97 (D.C.N.Y. 1959)).
129. Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 740 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D.P.R. 1990).
130. United States v. Sampson, Cr. No. 01-10384-MLW, 2012 WL
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Lack of circuit decisional law, 131 together with “confusion” in
other decisions in other cases or circuits, has been found to
provide the necessary “substantial grounds for difference of
opinion.” 132 Notably, however, in one case, the First Circuit
denied permission to appeal a certified order on the grounds that
there was an absence of a substantial grounds for difference of
opinion where there was no First Circuit decision on point. The
First Circuit based its denial on two other district court decisions
that had ruled similarly on the issue. 133 In another decision,
certification was denied as there was no “blazing split” among the
circuits as to the issue involving the scope of the attorney-client
privilege, and as the sole supporting case was twenty-five years
old, and it contained only “a paragraph of analysis.” 134 Moreover,
certification has been rejected where the aim or intent is to seek
reversal or modification of an existing First Circuit holding. 135
“The parties’ vociferous disagreement with [the district court’s
decision on the merits] will not satisfy” the requirement for
1633296, at *12 (D. Mass. May 10, 2012). (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
3, § 3930, at 494–95); see Discretionary Appeals, supra note 11, at 624
(“degree of legal doubt escapes precise quantification”).
131.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 957 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D. Mass.
1997) (explaining that “[S]ection 807B is a new enactment, and the question
of its preemption has not been resolved by any directly controlling legal
authority nor is there any precedent involving a similar or analogous
statute”). Cabral v. Sullivan, 757 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1991) (noting
issue was matter of first impression in circuit); Compare Kenney v. State
Street Corp., 694 F. Supp. 2d 67, 70 (D. Mass. 2011) (declining to certify order
granting in part and denying in part leave to file amended complaint as issue
of whether presumption of prudence applies n ERISA dispute had been
generally addressed by First Circuit and as such certification would not
materially advance the ultimate termination of the action).
132. Cabral, 757 F. Supp. at 112; see also Miara v. First Allmerica Fin.
Life Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 68, 68 (D. Mass. 2005) (noting that while its
determination on the underlying merits was based on legal precedent and
other circuits and was “apparent,” the “rationale of this court was only
persuasive authority” with a determination by the First Circuit able to put
the matter to rest).
133. Carabello-Seda v. Municipality of Hormigueros, 395 F.3d 7, 9 (1st
Cir. 2005); see also Kehoe v. Smolar, No. 73-1506-MA, 1982 WL 1574 (D.
Mass. Mar. 3, 1982). (explaining that “[t]his is not a case where other Circuits
are badly split and the First Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to reach a
decision that would provide some guidance.”).
134. In re Lupron Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12
(D. Mass. 2004).
135. See Kehoe, 1982 WL 1574, at *2.
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substantial grounds for a difference of opinion.136 Additionally, a
number of courts have noted that “novelty” is not enough and that
“the issue must relate to the actual legal principle itself, not the
application of that principle to a particular set of facts.” 137 As
such, Section 1292(b) certification does not necessarily arise when
“a court is called upon to apply a particular legal principle to a
novel fact pattern.” 138 Similarly, certification has been rejected
where the argument for certification is reduced to the contention
that the court misapplied settled law. 139
C. Materially Advance the Termination of Litigation
Whether the appeal may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation “is closely tied to the requirement
136.
Diane B. Bratvold, How to Get Heard: Practical Advice on
Interlocutory Appeals, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 2010, at 35.
137. United Airline Inc. v. Gregory, 716 F. Supp. 2d 79, 92 (D. Mass.
2010) (“Although this Court’s ruling may be the first instance in which a
court has applied he ADA preemption test to a tort claim by an airline
against a customer, the defendants over-state the novelty of the holding”).
See also Flor v. BOT Fin. Corp., 79 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting “that
the mere presence of a disputed issue that is a question of first impression,
standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate a substantial ground for
difference of opinion."); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 604 F.
Supp. 616, 620 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (stating that "the mere fact that there is a
lack of authority on a disputed issue does not necessarily establish some
substantial ground for a difference of opinion under the statute"); Max
Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 575 F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that
"the mere fact that the appeal would present a question of first impression is
not, of itself, sufficient to show that the question is one on which there is a
substantial ground for difference of opinion"; adding that "[t]he mere fact that
a substantially greater number of judges have resolved the issue one way
rather than another does not, of itself, tend to show that there is no
substantial ground for difference of opinion" and that "[i]t is the duty of the
district judge faced with a motion for certification to analyze the strength of
the arguments in opposition to the challenged ruling when deciding whether
the issue for appeal is truly one on which there is a substantial ground for
dispute"). Compare with Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 461
(1st Cir. 1990) (“impressed by the issue’s novelty and importance . . . we
allowed an interlocutory appeal”); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1010 n.1 (1st Cir 1988) (stating that the work product
issue sufficiently novel and important and “out of the ordinary” to justify
review); Abtox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 7 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting
novelty of question as supporting certification).
138. Gregory, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 92.
139. See Jackson Brook Inst., Inc., v. Dirs. & Officers of JBI (In re
Jackson Brook Inst., Inc.), 280 B.R. 1, 8, (D. Me. 2002).

WEIGANDFINALWORD[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/2/2014 1:24 PM

DISCRETIONARY INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

209

that the order involve a controlling question of law.” 140 “[A] legal
question cannot be termed ‘controlling’ if litigation would be
conducted in much the same manner regardless of the disposition
of the question upon appeal.” 141 Notably, the statutory criteria is
worded in terms of “may,” in that even if there is a measure of
doubt whether appellate resolution will facilitate advance
termination of the litigation, certification may still be
appropriate.142 For example, threshold controlling legal issues
such as subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, capacity
to be sued, and standing meet this requirement. 143
Advance termination of litigation has been noted by some
courts as not being limited to outright dispositive judicial
determination, but also includes where a decision may lead to
possible settlements. 144 It has been generally accepted that where
the appellate determination would result in either litigation or
similar actions “benefit[ing] from prompt resolution of th[e]
question,” certification is favored.145 The “materially advance

140. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 957 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D. Mass.
1997) (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3930, at 505; U.S. ex rel. La
Valley v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., No. 86-236-WF, 1990 WL 112285, at *3 (D.
Mass. July 30, 1990).
141. Bank of N.Y. v. Hoyt, 108 F.R.D. 184, 188 (D.R.I. 1985).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, Cr. No. 01-10384-MLW, 2012
WL 1633296, at *13 (D. Mass. May 10, 2012) (stating that “while inherently
uncertain, the conclusion of this § 2255 proceeding before this court ‘may’ be
facilitated by an interlocutory appeal.”); Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska)
Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that “neither 1292(b)’s literal
text nor controlling precedent requires that the interlocutory appeal have a
final, dispositive effect on the litigation, only that it ‘may materially advance’
the litigation.”); Kagan v. Dress (In re Clark-Franklin-Kingston Press, Inc.),
No. 90-11231, 1993 WL 160580, at *3 (stating that “interlocutory appeals
should be granted where resolution of the issue s on appeal might lead to
settlement”).
143. See, e.g., Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 58 F.3d 879, 881 (2d
Cir. 1995) (explaining that subject matter jurisdiction was a threshold issue);
Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1120 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
standing was another threshold issue).
144. See Clark-Kingston-Franklin, 1993 WL 160580, at *3.
145. Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 182 (quoting Camacho v.
P.R. Port Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 573 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also Lawson v. FMR
LLC., 724 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D. Mass. 2010) (stating that “the
fundamental legal issue is likely to shape both discovery initiatives and
settlement strategies in a fashion which should expedite resolution of the
case overall.”).
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termination of the litigation” criteria can be met by showing that
there is high possibility that any trial will be eliminated; that
significant issues or questions impacting the case will be
eliminated and will greatly narrow the remaining disputes; and
where the review would otherwise significantly narrow the scope
and cost of discovery.146
The First Circuit has observed, however, that “[t]he fact that
appreciable trial time may be saved is not determinative, for such
would often be true.” 147 Courts have also noted the advanced
stage of the litigation as well as proximity to trial to justify
denials of certification. 148 Moreover, where any advance
termination of the litigation is conjectural, it will be insufficient to
justify the appeal. Such conjecture has been found where there is
a likelihood of other issues arising regardless of the resolution of
the order sought to be certified. 149 This, in turn, also includes
146. U.S. ex rel. Lavalley v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., No. 86-236-WF, 1990
WL 112285, at *5 (D. Mass. July 30, 1990) (rejecting certification request as
issue would not “influence the scope or the presentation of evidence on the
substantive merits at trial”); see also Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 957
F. Supp. 327, 330 (D. Mass. 1997) (stating that “there is some possibility that
a finding of less than total preemption would leave something of the case, but
even in that event the scope of the case would be so significantly altered that
it would still be appropriate to call the question controlling”); Stark v.
Advance Magnetics, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 555, 560 (D. Mass. 1995) (reasoning
that “faced by an impending series of extraordinary complex and costly
expert depositions; all parties urge this court to certify the accuracy of the its
[ruling].”).
147. Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 782 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1985); see also
Perdomo-Rosa v. Corning Cable Sys., No. Civ. 02-2114(DRD), 2006 WL
695818, at *2 (D.P.R. Mar. 15, 2006) (stating that “the fact that appreciable
trial time may be saved is not determinative.”); Johnson v. Watts Regulator
Co., No. Civ. 92-508-D, 1994 WL 421112, at *2 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 1994)
(stating that “the fact that trial time may be saved does not provide sufficient
reason for certification under 1292(b)).”).
148. Zane S. Blanchard & Co., Inc. v. PSPT, Ltd., No. Civ. 92-660-SD,
1995 WL 17211933, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 20, 1995); LaValley, 1990 WL
112285, at *4; Bank of N.Y. v. Hoyt, 108 F.R.D. 184, 189 (D.R.I. 1985)
(stating that “where cases are close to trial, courts are understandably
reticent to grant interlocutory certification.”).
149. See, e.g., Johnson, 1994 WL 421112, at *2; Cummins v. EG&G
Sealol, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 64, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (quoting Wolgin v. Magic
Marker Corp., 472 F. Supp. 436, 438-39 (E.D. Pa. 1979)) (“[C]onjecture cannot
support a conclusion that the desired interlocutory appeal might materially
advance the termination of this litigation.”); see also Hoyt, 108 F.R.D. at 189
(quoting Magic Marker Corp., 472 F. Supp. at 439) (“[T]he moving party
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concerns that the issue sought to be certified could well become
moot. 150
The court is unlikely to find that termination of litigation
would be materially advanced where the same facts as to the
claim or issue subject to interlocutory appeal underlie separate
claims that have otherwise proceeded or will need to proceed in
the underlying litigation. 151 This can arise as to an order denying
a motion to dismiss in that an interlocutory appeal would be
appropriate “only where inclusion of that claim significantly
increases the complexity and duration of trial or pretrial
proceedings [and] [s]uch an increase is most likely where the
claim in question has no issues in common with the other
claims.” 152 If an appellate ruling on an issue would only dispose of
some but not all of the defendants or if little remains to do to
reach a final judgment, then most courts would consider an appeal
of a final judgment a better course than an immediate appeal of
an order. 153 Where the issue sought to be appealed is deemed
should come forward with something more than mere conjecture in support of
his claim that certification may save the court and the parties substantial
time and expense”); see also Barreras Ruiz v. American Tobacco Co., 977 F.
Supp. 545, 549 (D.P.R. 1997) (stating that “given the indisputably
indistinguishable nature of the evidence for jurisdiction and that for the
ultimate case, we see no possibility that the Court of Appeals would better
resolve this issue than well-deserved further discovery and reassessment
would. Because this matter cannot be resolved with any greater nitidity,
appellate review would actually delay the ultimate termination of the
litigation.”).
150. See Cummins, 697 F. Supp. at 69 (noting the “number of ways” the
retaliation issue, seeking to be certified, could become moot).
151. See, e.g., Carabello-Seda v. Mun. of Hormigueros, 395 F.3d 7, 9 (1st
Cir. 2005); Beltran v. O’Mara, No. Civ. 04-CV-071-JD, 2006 WL 1240558, at
*4 (D.N.H. Jan. 31, 2006). In Standard Quimica De Venezuala v. Central
Hispanic, Intern Inc., the court remarked that the closer the issue is to the
merits the more it suggested that an interlocutory appeal should not be
granted. 189 F.R.D. 202, 208 (D.P.R. 1999); see also Barreras Ruiz, 977 F.
Supp. at 545 (“Given the indisputably indistinguishable nature of the
evidence for jurisdiction and that for the ultimate case, we see no possibility
that the Court of Appeals would better resolve this issue than well deserved
further discovery and reassessment would.”).
152. Cummins, 697 F. Supp. at 72 (quoting Interlocutory Appeals in the
Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 621–22
(1975)).
153. See, e.g., Pacamor Bearings Inc. v. Minebea Co., Ltd., 892 F. Supp.
347, 362 (D.N.H. 1995) (finding the issue of standing not dispositive as such
would not affect additional plaintiff); Ashmore v. Ne. Petroleum Div. of
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“straightforward” and the litigation not one subjected to being
prolonged 154 or where the only issue remaining is damages, the
element is not met. 155
The First Circuit has not directly addressed the propriety of
certifying state law issues but at least one district court case
within the district has held that such certification was
inappropriate.156 Indeed, the court expressed concern that
“Section 1292(b) must not be used to transmogrify a legitimate
cause of action into a legal pinball bouncing from court to court in
the federal and state judicial systems.” 157 There, the Cummins
court granted a motion to amend a complaint in an age
discrimination suit to allow former employer to assert a state tort
law claim of retaliatory discharge. 158 Finding little case law on
the propriety of certifying a purely state law issue under 1292(b),
it held such certification inappropriate as: (a) it was likely it
would certify the issue to state court following a full trial if
necessary; (b) delaying certification to state court after trial would
afford state supreme court benefit of evaluating issue upon full
record; and (c) that if certified the First Circuit would likely feel
compelled to certify the issue to state court causing further
Cargill, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D. Me. 1994) (noting that even if
standing ruling was in error “no factual issue or litigant would be removed
from the case”); LaValley, 1990 WL 112285, at *4 (showing that “denial of
certification is further supported by the advanced stage of the litigation”);
Thompson Trading Ltd. v. Allied Lyons PLC., 124 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D.R.I.
1989) (stating that the ruling on the motion to dismiss only concerns two of
the five defendants); Cummins, 697 F. Supp. at 69 (quoting Hoyt, 108 F.R.D.
at 189) (“[W]here cases are close to trial, courts are understandably reticent
to grant interlocutory certification.”).
154. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Koshen, 746 F. Supp. 2d
375, 389 (D.R.I. 2010) (citing Thompson, 124 F.R.D. at 538) (noting that the
case was not the “rare case of ‘prolonged litigation in which a piecemeal
appeal is justified’” and that issues in the case are straightforward”); Lipsett
v. Univ. of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D.P.R. 1990) (citing Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 988, 991 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
155. See, e.g., Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 251, 252 (D.
Mass. 2011).
156. See Cummins, 697 F. Supp. at 70.
157. Id. at 71. Cf. Stevens Linen Assocs., Inc. v. Crawford, Civ. A. No. 9340159-GN, 1993 WL 483146, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 1993) (applying the
standards under 1292(b) to determine whether to certify state issue to state
supreme court).
158. Id. at 65.
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delay. 159
The penultimate consideration for both the controlling
question of law and materially advance termination of litigation
elements is the elimination or minimization of the burdens of
litigation on the parties and judicial system. “The difficulty and
general importance of the question presented, the probability of
reversal, the significance of the gains from reversal, and the
hardship on the parties in their particular circumstances, [should]
all be considered.” 160
D. Discretionary Residue
It remains unclear whether the district court has the
discretion to deny a certification request even when all three of
the statutory criteria have been met. While the plain statutory
language provides for no such additional discretion, 161 Judge
Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York has held to the

159. Id. at 70.
160. WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 3, § 3930, at 514. In Lipsett v. Univ. of
P.R., the court stated that “advantages and disadvantages of immediate
appeal in light of the guidelines provided in the statute” should be
considered. 740 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D.P.R. 1990). It also stated that:
The disadvantages of immediate appeal increase with probabilities
that a long appellate consideration will be required, the order will be
affirmed, the continued district court proceedings without appeal
might moot the issue, reversal would not substantially alter the
course of the district court proceedings, and the parties will not be
relieved of any significant burden by reversal.
Id. The court in Miller v. New America High Income Fund certified an order
denying a motion to dismiss involving a claim of security law violations,
stating in part:
Given New America’s questionable pedigree, the vigor with which
legal battles such as these are usually fought, the amount of money
at stake, and the time and expense likely to be involved—combined
with the likelihood of eventual appeal and the present need to fix the
Plaintiff Class with some certainty— I further find, pursuant to
[1292(b)], that immediate appeal from this order would materially
advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.
755 F. Supp. 1099, 1110 (D. Mass. 1991).
161. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery
Orders in Federal Court: A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege
Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 780 (2006) (“[T]he text of [§ 1292(b)] simply
does not give the district court unlimited discretion [to deny certification
when the statutory factors are present].”).
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contrary. 162 Under his view in National Asbestos, Section 1292(b)
was based on a trial judge’s peculiar knowledge of the case and
any beneficial effect any interlocutory appeal would have as to the
litigation, thus conferring the power to consider factors beyond the
statutory criteria. 163
The certification requirement was adopted to grant to the
district court authority to consider the multitude of
factors peculiar to any given case [and that] in order to
effectively make these ad hoc calculations, the district
court must necessarily have the power to consider factors
beyond the minimum criteria established in [S]ection
1292(b). 164
Under this view, a district court judge is free to weigh such
factors as: (1) the amount of time an appeal would take; (2) the
need and effect of a stay on the litigation including discovery; the
probability of reversal on appeal; (3) the effect of reversal on the
remaining claims; (4) the benefit of further factual development
and a complete record on appeal, particularly in rapidly
developing or unsettled areas of the law; and (5) the probability
that other issues may moot the need for the interlocutory
appeal. 165 The First Circuit has not directly addressed the issue;
to date, only one district court within the First Circuit specifically
cited to Judge Weinstein’s decision and the proposition that the
district court’s discretion is not confined to the statutory
criteria. 166
162. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71 F.
Supp. 2d 139, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (per curiam) (“district courts…have
independent and ‘unreviewable’ authority to deny certification even where
the three statutory criteria are met.”); see also Chevron v. Donziger, NO. 11
Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 WL 98013 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013)(citing Nat’l
Asbestos, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 161–66 and stating that not every order that
satisfies the standard of § 1292(b) should be satisfied and there may be other
non-statutory criteria).
163. Nat’l Asbestos, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also United States v. Sampson, No. 01-10384, 2012 WL
1633296, at *9 (D. Mass. May 10, 2010) (Mem.) (quoting Swint v. Chambers
Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995) (“Congress thus chose to confer on
district courts first line discretion to allow interlocutory appeals.”).
166. See Sampson, 2012 WL 1633296, at *9. The court in Sampson is the
only district court outside of New York to cite and rely upon National
Asbestos.
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Additionally, terminology that continues to permeate the
First Circuit, as well as other circuits’ law, is the use of the
phrases “extraordinary” or “exceptional” in describing
circumstances where Section 1292(b) should be used. 167 In In re
Heddendorf 168 and later in McGillicuddy 169 and Camacho,170 the
First Circuit emphasized the point that the Court would “hew
carefully to the McGillicuddy line—for we continue to believe that
the instances where [S]ection 1292(b) may appropriately be
utilized will, realistically, be few and far between.” 171 The notion
of “extraordinary” or “exceptional” stems from an early Third
Circuit decision and can seemingly take on a life of its own as a
separate, independent standard for both certification and
167. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d
1007, 1010, n.1 (1st Cir. 1988); Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 782 F.2d 313, 314 (1st
Cir. 1986); McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76, 76 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984);
Oskoian v. Canuel, 264 F.2d 591, 594 (1st Cir. 1959); Heddendorf v. Goldfine
(In re Heddendorf), 263 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1959); Widi v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, No. 1:11-cv-02011-JAW, 2011 WL 5877543, at *5 (D. Me. Nov. 23,
2011); Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 251, 252 (D. Mass.
2011); Southwire Co. v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., Civil No. 03-1100
(GAG/CVR), 2010 WL 446593, at *3 (D.P.R. Feb. 1, 2010); Faigin v. Kelly, 923
F. Supp. 298, 299 (D.N.H. 1996); Zane S. Blanchard & Co., Inc. v. PSPT,
Ltd., No. Civ. 92-660-SD, 1995 WL 17211933, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 20, 1995);
Veale v. Marlborough, No. CIV. 92-355-SD, 1995 WL 136902, at *1 (D.N.H.
Mar. 22, 1995); Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., No. CIV. 92-508-JD, 1994
WL 421112, at *1 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 1994); McCarthy v. Azure, No. CIV. 92523-SD, 1994 WL 258316, at *1 (D.N.H. Jan. 24, 1994); Thompson Trading
Ltd. v. Allied Lyons PLC., 124 F.R.D. 534, 537 (D.R.I. 1989); Cummins v. EG
& G Sealol, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 64, 68 (D.R.I. 1988); United States v.
Arkwright, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (D.N.H. 1988); Donahue v. R.I.
Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps., 632 F. Supp. 1456, 1481
n.14 (D.R.I. 1986); Bank of N.Y. v. Hoyt, 108 F.R.D. 184, 187–88 (D.R.I.
1985). Accord Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 228 F. Supp. 2d 40, 49–
50 (D.R.I. 2002) (noting that Heddendorf’s admonition that 1292(b) should be
used sparingly and only in exceptional cases is “widely shared across the
circuits”).
168. Heddendorf, 263 F.2d at 888 (quoting Milbert v. Bison Lab, Inc., 260
F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 1958)) (stating that 1292(b) should be used “sparingly”
and only in “exceptional cases”).
169. McGillicuddy, 746 F.2d at 76 n.1 (admonishing that interlocutory
certification “should be used sparingly and only in exceptional
circumstances”).
170. Camacho v. P.R. Port Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 573 (1st Cir. 2004)
(“Section 1292(b) is meant to be used sparingly and appeal under it are
accordingly hen’s-teeth rare”).
171. San Juan, 859 F.2d at 1010 n.1.
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permission to appeal.172 Indeed, as formulated by the First
Circuit in McGillicuddy, “exceptional circumstances” must be
shown in addition to meeting the statutory criteria. 173 Other
courts have declared the concept of “extraordinary” or
“exceptional” as unhelpful and a “shibboleth.” 174
V. COURT OF APPEALS DISCRETION

Once the district court has certified an order under Section
1292(b), the court of appeals provides its own review. Pursuant to
the statutory terms, the court of appeals may “permit” the appeal
172. See Milbert, 260 F.2d at 433 (3d Cir. 1958); see also United States v.
Sampson, No. 01-10384-MLW, 2012 WL 1633296, at *11 (D. Mass. May 10,
2012) (explaining that a party bears ‘heavy burden” of showing “exceptional
circumstances”); Widi, 2011 WL 587754, at *5 (quoting San Juan, 859 F.2d at
1010 n.1.) (stating that “only rare cases” will qualify for certification and
“only in exceptional circumstances”); Matamoros, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 252
(noting that “dire circumstances” must exist for interlocutory review); Colon
v. Blades, No. 07-1380, 2009 WL 3347627, at *5 (D.P.R. Oct. 14, 2009) (citing
Palandjian and In re Heddendorf and stating interlocutory appeal only
proper in “exceptional circumstances” and where statutory criteria met);
Standard Quimica De Venez. v. Central Hispano Int’l, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 202,
208 (D.P.R. 1999) (quoting In re San Juan, 859 F.2d at 1010 n.1.) (“Pursuant
to the statute, interlocutory review is appropriate only in ‘rare cases’
involving ‘exceptional circumstances’ and ‘novel and important’ issues.”);
MacFarlane v. McKean, No. 92-614-SD, 1994 WL 255311, at *1 (D.N.H. June
8, 1994) (denying certification stating that ruling at issue “fails to present
either exceptional circumstances or any difficult and pivotal questions of law
not settled by controlling authority”); Smith v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 733 F.
Supp. 484, 490 (D.N.H. 1990) (denying request to certify stating in part that
“[c]onsiderably more by way of exceptional circumstances is required”).
173. McGillicuddy, 746 F.2d at 76 n.1 (Section 1292(b) “should be used
sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, and where the proposed
intermediate appeal presents one or more difficult and pivotal questions of
law not settled by controlling authority.”) (emphasis added); see also Estate of
Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 28, 47 (D. Mass. 2002)
(quoting McGillicuddy, 746 F.2d at 76 n.1).
174. See, e.g., Hadjpateras v. Pacifica S. A., 290 F. 2d 697, 703 n.13 (5th
Cir. 1961). There is also reference, at times, to Section 1292(b) being
available only in complex or drawn-out litigation such as “anti-trust” or
“conspiracy” cases. See Cummins, 697 F. Supp. 64, 68–69 (D.R.I. 1988)
(quoting Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1245 n.7 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972); Milbert, 260 F.2d at 433). There are
also cases noting need for the litigation to be “prolonged.” Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of R.I. v. Koshen, 746 F. Supp. 2d 375, 389 (D.R.I. 2010); Lipsett v.
Univ. of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D.P.R. 1990) (citing Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 988, 991 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
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“in its discretion.” 175 Other than this cursory reference to
permissive discretion, the section provides no other guidance or
criteria. The statute is unclear as to whether the listed criteria
that apply to district court discretion are applicable to appellate
discretion, or whether, if it is applicable, such discretion is or is
not limited to such criteria. Further exacerbating the matter is
the fact that the decisions by the court of appeals permitting or
denying any Section 1292(b) appeal are generally not reported or
contain little analysis. The appellate courts usually issue a simple
order and subsequently note in the appellate decision on the
merits if permission is granted. 176
Both the legislative history and the United States Supreme
Court have compared the appellate courts’ discretion in permitting
or denying Section 1292(b) appeals with the Supreme Court’s
discretion as to writs of certiorari, and both have stated that the
request can be denied “for any reason, including docket
congestion.” 177 According to one authority, “[t]he discretion of the
court of appeals is so broad that it is difficult to imagine any
controlling limit—the prospect that the Supreme Court might
reverse a refusal to permit appeal is vanishingly small.” 178
Specifically, the First Circuit has expressly noted that its
discretion is separate from the district court’s discretion. 179 In its
first reported decision regarding Section 1292(b), the First Circuit
recognized that the statute did not lay out any standards or
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012).
176. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. Banco Cent., 917 F.2d 664, 665 (1st Cir. 1990)
(“Because the circuits are divided about the proper answer to this question
and because the district court has followed the minority view, we agreed to
answer this question” in a 1292(b) appeal.); Sandler v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
649 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1981) (dismissed appeal on grounds it had become
unclear what question would control disposition of action).
177. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978); Digital
Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2454, 2461 (1978); S. REP.
No. 2434, at 3–4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5355, 5257.
178. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3929, at 446; see also Spieel v. Trs. of
Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 46 n.7 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Morrison-Knudsen
Co., Inc. v. J. D. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1981)) (“[T]he mechanism
permits the Court of Appeals to protect its docket by determining for itself
whether to accept the issue for review.”).
179. See Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision) (“This court must make its own determination
whether it will accept an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 1292(b).”).
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criteria to guide the court of appeals in its exercise of discretion
following certification by the district court. 180 The court stated,
however, that the “appellate court should at least concur with the
district court in the opinion that the proposed appeal presents a
difficult central question of law which is not settled by controlling
authority, and that a prompt decision by the appellate court at
this advanced stage would serve the cause of justice by
accelerating ‘the ultimate termination of the litigation.’” 181 It then
went on to identify a penultimate consideration: the need to weigh
the asserted need for the appeal against the policy of discouraging
piecemeal appeals. 182 One commentator agrees with the appellate
courts and has stated that a purpose behind Section 1292(b) was
to reduce the screening burden at the appellate level. 183 As such,
they contend that “[s]o long as the trial court has considered all
relevant and no improper factors in making its determination, the
court of appeals should not reconsider whether certification was
appropriate.” 184
The discretion of the court of appeals would encompass the
right to change its mind and dismiss the appeal at anytime. 185
180. See Heddendorf v. Goldfine (In re Heddendorf), 263 F.2d 887, 889
(1st Cir. 1959) (Magruder, C.J.). It has been noted that Judge Magruder,
who wrote the majority opinion in Heddendorf, dissented from the Judicial
Conference recommendation of the legislation.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id. According to the court in Heddendorf:
[T]he court must weigh the asserted need for the proposed
interlocutory appeal with the policy in the ordinary case of
discouraging ‘piecemeal appeals.’ Perhaps there is always some
hardship caused by application of the ‘final decision’ rule. Yet the
rule is beneficial in most applications, because piecemeal appeals
would result in even greater hardships and tremendous additional
burdens on the courts and litigants which would follow from allowing
appeals from interlocutory orders on issues that might later become
moot. The ‘discretion’ of the appellate court should be exercised in
the light of this fundamental consideration.
Id.
183. Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 617 (1975) [hereinafter Interlocutory Appeals].
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Caraballo-Seda v. Mun. of Hormigueros, 395 F.3d 7, 9 (1st
Cir. 2005); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Mont., 969 F.2d 848, 848–49 (9th Cir.
1992) (dismissing appeal after permission granted because sole issue raised
on appeal had been addressed by court in prior decision); Bush v. EaglePicher Indus., Inc. (In re All Asbestos Cases), 849 F.2d 452, 453–54 (9th Cir.
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The rationale for allowing this discretion is that “[n]either the
district court nor the court of appeals can foresee, at the time the
appeal is certified and accepted, the course of reasoning that the
court of appeals will follow at the time of decision. Alternatively,
if only the certified question could be decided, the court of appeals
would have to choose between deciding a question that may be—or
clearly is—irrelevant to the ultimate decision, or refusing to
decide anything at all.” 186
The First Circuit has used this discretionary power on a
number of occasions and retracted its previous permission to
appeal. 187 For instance, the First Circuit, after considering the
briefs and oral argument on the merits, opted to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that it had become unclear what question
would control the outcome of the litigation. 188 More recently, the
First Circuit more directly stated that its prior permission was in
error given that: (a) courts generally do not permit interlocutory
appeal from denial of motions to dismiss; (b) two other district
court decisions in the same district answered the question; and (c)
other claims arising from the same facts remained pending thus
resulting in the lack of a substantial grounds for difference of
opinion or that the appeal would materially advance the
termination of the litigation.189
It remains that the First Circuit, both in its initial decision
under Section 1292(b) and in more recent times, continues to
stress that it will exercise its discretion “judiciously.” 190 In its
view, “interlocutory appeals [remain] disruptive, time-consuming

1988) (dismissing appeal after permission granted because intervening
Supreme Court decision clarified that appellate jurisdiction rested in the
Federal Circuit).
186. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, at § 3929, at 461.
187. See, e.g., Sandler v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 649 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir.
1981); United States v. Salter, 421 F.2d 1393, 1394 (1st Cir. 1970). Accord
Slade v. Shearson, Hammil & Co., Inc., 517 F.2d 398, 399–00 (2d Cir. 1974).
188. See Sandler, 649 F.2d at 20; Salter, 421 F.2d. at 1394 (vacating order
allowing interlocutory appeal after reconsideration, concluding that the pretrial discovery order did not “involve an ultimate question of law in the case”).
189. See Carabello-Seda v. Mun. of Homigueros, 395 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir.
2005).
190. See, e.g., McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76, 76 n.1 (1st Cir.
1984). Accord Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 294
(1st Cir. 2000).
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and expensive.” 191
VI. STATISTICAL REVIEW

The Administrative Office of the United States Courts tracks
and publishes extensive statistics on the filings, disposition and
caseloads of all federal courts. 192 Despite the array of reports and
statistics made available, they do not separately identify or
publish district court certifications under 1292(b), nor do they
report appellate court orders granting or denying permission to
appeal. 193 Out of all the circuits, including the First Circuit, it
appears only the Fifth Circuit and Federal Circuit actually
publish statistics pertaining to section 1292(b) petitions.194
Through the use of the Westlaw database, this article has
compiled a review of all First Circuit and district court cases in
New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Puerto Rico and Rhode
Island in which Section 1292(b) was mentioned or referenced. The
following survey of cases since 1958 is, however, likely incomplete
insofar as many district court decisions on 1292(b) certifications,
particularly denials, are not reported or will otherwise not make
their way into the Westlaw database. Similarly, most court of
appeals decisions as to whether to permit the 1292(b) appeal once
certified by the district court are also not reported. While grants
of 1292(b) appeals can be sometimes found in a note or brief
reference in many of the ultimate appellate decisions on the
merits, there are relatively few published decisions where there is
reference or discussion of denials of 1292(b) appeals. Accordingly,
the statistical review set forth below will be skewed toward grants
of certifications and allowances of appeal. Nonetheless, the review
from the resulting sampling may be potentially informative. A
summary of the findings follows.

191. Waste Mgmt., 208 F.2d at 294 (“Thus, we have elevated the threshold
for discretionary review. . .”).
192. See generally, Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://uscourts.gov
/Statistics (Jan. 6, 2014).
193. See Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 182, at 607 n.5.
194. See generally U.S.C.A. 5TH CIR., CLERK ANNUAL REPORT: MONTHLY
REPORT OF ADMINISTRATIVE-MOTIONS SUBMITTED TO JUDGES 31 (2012); see also
Hess et al., supra note 1, at 759 (reviewing fifteen years of discretionary
interlocutory appeals in the Federal Circuit between 1995 and 2010).
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1959–1970
→Sixteen cases involving 1292(b) interlocutory appeal
issues;
→Three cases district court denied certification request;
→Thirteen cases district court granted certification
request;
→Four cases court of appeals denied permission to
appeal;
→Nine cases court of appeals granted permission to
appeal.
Out of the sixteen cases involving 1292(b) interlocutory
appeal issues, there were eight unreported decisions. Six of the
district court decisions simply recited the statutory criteria with
no disclosed application, while two decisions disclosed a measure
of application of the criteria to the particular issue and
circumstances. Of the thirteen certifications that were granted by
the district court, the court of appeals granted permission to
appeal in nine cases and denied permission in four cases.
Of the three district court denials of certification, one found
no likelihood of litigation termination even if the issue was
certified; one found no controlling issue of law; and the other did
not have an available decision. In the four cases where
certification was granted by the district court, but permission to
appeal was denied by the First Circuit, two of the rulings had no
published opinions. The other two involved a published opinion
reconsidering its earlier grant of permission. These two cases held
that the pretrial disclosure issue did not present a “controlling
issue of law” and a determination, upon a full published decision,
that the fee order at issue if reviewed would not advance
termination of the litigation.
There were two court of appeals decisions as to 1292(b)
permission that were reported and nine that were unreported. As
to the two that were reported, one reconsidered its prior ruling
permitting the appeal while the other set out its decision to deny a
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request to permit appeal as to a discovery order involving an
internal revenue subpoena. 195 Of the nine reported cases where
both certification and permission to appeal were granted, five
were reversed and four affirmed as to the underlying merits.
The very first decision of the First Circuit under Section
1292(b) remains a notable one. 196 There, Judge Magruder denied
permission to appeal, stating that the fundamental consideration
under the statute was “weigh[ing] the asserted need for the
proposed interlocutory appeal with the policy . . . discouraging
‘piecemeal appeals.’” 197 The court noted the “scant” reference by
the district court to the statute and the failure to specifically
identify and apply the statutory criteria. 198 Nonetheless, it
refused to deny permission to appeal based on the cursory
certification stating that it “might perhaps be treated as a
‘shorthand form’ of the required findings.” 199 It proceeded to deny
permission on the basis that the order for fees at issue was not
clearly an “interlocutory order” but a final collateral order
appealable as a final judgment. The court explained that even if a
proper order under Section 1292(b), permission would not be
justified as the resolution of the fee issue would not lead to
advance termination of the underlying litigation given its removal
on the merits. 200 Judge Magruder stated that the starting point
for the circuit court’s discretion is the statutory criteria.
Otherwise, she reaffirmed the compelling interests behind the
final judgment rule and explained that “[t]he discretion of the
appellate court [under Section 1292(b)] should be exercised in the
light of this fundamental consideration.”
In a second case decided that same year (1959), the First
Circuit granted permission to appeal in an action involving a
question of “capacity” to be sued and the interpretation and
interaction of then Rules 17(b) and 23(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 201 It found that there was only one other decision
195. See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563, 564 (1st Cir. 1970).
196. See generally Heddendorf v. Goldfine (In re Heddendorf), 263 F.2d
887 (1st Cir. 1959) (Magruder, C.J.).
197. Id. at 889.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 888–90.
200. Id. at 889–91.
201. Oskoian v. Canuel, 264 F.2d 591, 593–94 (1st Cir. 1959).

WEIGANDFINALWORD[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/2/2014 1:24 PM

223

DISCRETIONARY INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

addressing the issue and the decision was contrary to the
conclusion reached by the district court. It also found that a
ruling by the First Circuit that the district court had erred in
failing to dismiss the complaint would “forestall what might well
be a long and expensive trial.” 202
The types of cases and orders varied. Three of the sixteen
were anti-trust related with the remainder running the gamut
including a shareholder dispute, securities litigation, an action
under the Jones Act, and a discrimination action. The types of
orders varied greatly as well with only two of the sixteen cases
similar (statute of limitations). A listing of the orders and actions
taken between 1959 and 1970 are as follows:
TYPES OF ACTIONS AND ORDERS: 1959–1970
-The following key accompanies the table below with regard to
the disposition of the corresponding cases in the tableCD
CG
AP
AD
MA
MR

Cert. Denied
Cert. Granted
Appeal Permitted
Appeal Denied
Merits Affirmed
Merits Reversed

Order
Striking affirmative defenses
under Jones Act, pertaining to
the issue of whether plaintiff
could bring action for
negligence and
unseaworthiness under
maritime law where plaintiff
had obtained award or remedy
under Puerto Rico’s Workers’
Compensation Act. 203

CD

CG
×

AP

AD
×

MA

MR

202. Id. at 594.
203. Flores v. Prann, 178 F. Supp. 845, 845 (D.P.R. 1959), aff’d, 282 F.2d
153 (1st Cir. 1960) (noting district court’s earlier grant of certification under
1292(b) as well as subsequent denial by First Circuit).
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Injunctive relief as to anti-trust
issue. 204
Award of certain fees in
minority shareholder suit. 206
Denial of motion to dismiss
relating to capacity to be sued
in action by members of one
union against members of
another union. 207
Statute of Limitations and
whether the Federal Trade
Commission proceedings tolled
the statute of limitations under
Clayton Act; partial summary
judgment. 208
Order denying remand in
insurance coverage action
involving multiple parties 209
Order to quash summons. 210

× 205

×

×

×
×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

204. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England Inc., 180 F.
Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), aff’d, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960).
205. The issue was certified in “the alternative” to certification under
1292(a)(1). In re Donald F. Heger, 180 F. Supp. 147, 147 (D. Minn. 1959)
206. In re Heffeddendorf, 263 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir. 1959) (finding that it
would not advance the termination of litigation).
207. Oskoian v. Canuel, 264 F.2d 591, 594 (1st Cir.1959) (finding that
there was only one case on point; that it was distinguishable; that an
appellate ruling reversing the denial of the dismissal would “forestall what
might well be a long and expensive trial.”). The district court’s certification in
Oskoian was unpublished. See also Oskoian v. Canuel, 269 F.2d 311, 312 (1st
Cir. 1959) (granting leave “in order to resolve a basic and difficult problem of
practice.”).
208. United Shoe Mach. Corp v. Int’l Shoe Mach. Corp., 275 F.2d 459, 459
(1st Cir. 1960).
209. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 303 F.2d 57, 58
(1st Cir. 1962). Notably, Congress has enacted a statutory prohibition to any
type of appeal as to grants of motions to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006).
This provision provides: “An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . ” But see
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 340–41 (1976),
abrogated in part by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711–12
(1996) (reviewing a remand order when a district court judge remanded on
grounds his docket was too full).
210. Martinez v. Karageorgis, 235 F. Supp. 1012, 1013 (D.P.R. 1963).
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Statute of limitations tolling
under Clayton Act. 211
Order to prepare plan to
address racial segregation in
schools. 212
Obligation to pay taxes. 213
Ruling that Federal Employers
Compensation Act did not bar
contribution claim under
FTCA. 214
Denial of motion to dismiss
P.R. Dealer Contract Law. 215
Discovery order as to internal
revenue subpoena. 216
Federal jurisdiction over abuse
of process claim involving
FAA. 218
Diversity jurisdiction under
1333(c) in declaratory judgment
action pertaining to
insurance. 219
Denial of motion to dismiss
complaint in action by SEC for
violation of security laws. 220

×

×

×

×

×
×

×
×

×

×

×

×

×
×

×
× 217

×

×

×

×

×

211. Farmington Dowel Prods. Co v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967,
968 (D. Me. 1963), aff’d on merits, 436 F.2d 699 n.2 (1st Cir. 1970).
212. Barksdale v. Springfield Sch. Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543, 544 (D.
Mass. 1965). Springfield Sch. Comm. v. Banksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 262 (1st
Cir. 1965) (noting the importance of the question).
213. Benitez Rexach v. United States, 390 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1968).
214. Newport Air Park, Inc v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809, 812 (D.R.I.
1968), rev’d 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1969).
215. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 563, 568–69 (1st Cir. 1970).
216. United States v. Salter, 421 F.2d 1393, 1394 (1st Cir. 1970) (not
controlling issue of law and noting that “pretrial disclosure[s] may indeed
involve an ultimate question of law in the case but it may not.”).
217. The Court in Salter reconsidered its earlier grant of permission. Id.
218. Nationwide Charters & Conventions, Inc. v. Garber, 254 F. Supp. 85,
86 (D. Mass. 1966).
219. White v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 356 F.2d 746, 747 (1st Cir.
1966).
220. SEC v. Wong, 254 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.P.R. 1966) (noting that
proffered interpretation of applicable security law was not in accord with
pertinent authority and even if defendant was correct, a full trial was still
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DENIALS OF CERTIFICATION OR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL: 1959–1970 221
Number of Cases
No Available Opinion or
Discussion
Meaningful Explanation
Rote Recitation of Criteria
No Controlling Question of Law
No Difference of Opinion
No Likelihood of Early
Termination
Need More Facts
Other

7
3
3
1
1
1
2
-

FRANTS OF CERTIFICATION AND APPEAL: RESULTS
ON MERITS-1959–1970

Number of Cases Granting
Certification and Permission
to Appeal
Reversed
Affirmed
Reversed in Part Affirmed in
Part

9
4
5
-

1971–1985
→Fifty-one reported cases in where 1292(b) certification
was addressed;
→Seven cases where district court denied certification
request;

needed as to other defendants and not the type of question “as can’t charge
congress with absurdity”).
221. The chart includes decisions where more than one reasons for the
denial or permission to appeal were identified.
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→Forty-four cases
certification request:

where

district

court

granted

→Twenty-eight cases where court of appeals granted
permission to appeal;
→Four reported cases where court of appeals specifically
denied permission to appeal;
→Twelve cases where no appeal was
unpublished denial of permission to appeal

taken

or

Out of the fifty-one reported cases in which 1292(b)
certification was addressed between 1971 and 1985, thirty-one
decisions denied or permitted certification with a rote recitation of
the statutory criteria; four cases revealed a measure of application
to the facts and circumstances; and the remaining sixteen were
unreported/unavailable.
There were a total of eleven decisions composed of seven cases
where certification was denied by the district court and four cases
where permission to appeal was denied by the First Circuit. Five
of the district court denials were either a summary recitation of
the statutory criteria or no reported decision at all. As to the two
remaining denials of certification, one found no controlling
question of law while the other found both the lack of a controlling
question of law and no likelihood of advance termination of the
litigation. Two of the four denials for permission to appeal by the
First Circuit were reconsiderations of earlier grants of permission.
Out of the four total denials of permission to appeal; one was due
to lack of properly certified question below; two based on the lack
of a controlling question of law where there was a viable difference
of opinion; and one presented the possibility that the certified
question was a hypothetical and, even if it was not a hypothetical,
there was a need for further factual development. Out of the
twenty-five reported decisions where the court of appeals
permitted the appeal and addressed the underlying merits,
fourteen were affirmed and eleven reversed as to the underlying
merits.
Out of the thirty-two reported and known cases in which the
First Circuit either granted or denied permission to appeal (with
an additional eighteen unknown), there were only four reported
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decisions with some measure of analysis; three denying
permission to appeal and the other reversing the district court on
the merits but noting in a footnote that it believed it had erred in
granting permission to appeal. In one case, the First Circuit
found the interlocutory appeal under both a notice of appeal or
mandamus to be improper. In this case, one of the defendants had
failed to seek permission to appeal with the First Circuit, first,
after the initial certification and then again after
recertification.222 In another, the First Circuit addressed an
appeal premised on a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the
district court to certify its order dismissing the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 223 Denying the write of mandamus,
the First Circuit noted that such a writ requires that the right to
the issuance of the writ be “clear and indisputable,” which takes
away its discretion underlying Section 1292(b). 224
The First Circuit issued two published opinions in which it
reconsidered an earlier permission to pursue the interlocutory
appeal. 225 In one, it stated that it was “no longer satisfied that the
question certified” met the Section 1292(b) criteria. 226 The
question certified was an order denying a motion to dismiss for a
complaint that alleged employment discrimination. The plaintiff
claimed he was not hired as a flight attendant due to being a
married man and/or having children.227 The court found that the
complaint may well not state a viable claim thus rendering the
certified question a “hypothetical” and that, even if it did state a
proper claim, that additional facts needed to be developed before a
legal determination could be made.228
In the second case, the First Circuit proceeded to address the
interlocutory appeal on the merits, and reversed the district court
order denying a motion to dismiss as to a Section 1983 claim. 229 It
noted in a footnote that it had erred in granting permission to

222. In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 515 F.2d 94, 95 (1st Cir. 1975).
223. In re Maritime Service Corp., 515 F.2d 91, 92 (1st Cir. 1976).
224. Id.
225. Sandler v. E. Airlines, Inc., 649 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1981);
McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76, 76 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984).
226. Sandler, 649 F.2d at 20.
227. Id. at 19.
228. Id. at 20.
229. McGillicuddy, 746 F.2d at 77.
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229

appeal and stated that it would “not normally allow an appeal
from a denial of a motion to dismiss” and that certification under
Section 1292(b) “should be used sparingly and only in exceptional
circumstances.” 230
Of the fifty-one cases, five concerned statute of limitations
issues; at least fifteen involved, in some fashion, statutory
construction issues; and two addressed personal jurisdiction. The
specific orders and action taken as to certification between 1971
and 1985 are as follows:
TYPE OF ACTIONS AND ORDERS: 1971–1985
-The following key accompanies the table below with regard to
the disposition of the corresponding cases in the tableCD
CG
AP
AD
MA
MR

Cert. Denied
Cert. Granted
Appeal Permitted
Appeal Denied
Merits Affirmed
Merits Reversed

Order
Order consolidating 32 cases for
liability but not for damages 231
Orders under Securities and
Exchange Act re: statute’s
exemption from registration
requirements; statute of limitations;
implied private right remedy; and
standing. 233
Order denying summary judgment
and partially denying motion to

CD
× 232

CG

AP

AD

MA

MR

×

×

230. Id. at 76 n.1.
231. In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving the Air Crash Disaster
Near Hanover, N.H., on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F. Supp. 907, 907–08 (D.N.H.
1971).
232. Id. at 911 (Summarily denying the request for certification stating
only that the Court is “of the opinion that interlocutory appeal is not the
proper mode of review of this order.”).
233. Dyer v. E. Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 900 (D. Me. 1971).
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dismiss as to viability of Securities
claim based on material
misstatement or omission. 234
Order denying motion for summary
judgment based on defendant’s
waiver of statute of limitations
under Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act. 235
Order as to pendent jurisdiction in
labor dispute. 236
Order holding Section 13 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
applicable to log-driving
activities. 238
Orders pertaining to venue and
whether importer or distributor is
“automobile manufacturer” under
15 U.S.C. 1221(a). 239
Order dismissing complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction
rejecting applicability of the
Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. 801-842. 240
Order vacating consent decree in

×

×

×
×

×

× 237
×

×

×

×

× 241

×

×

×

234. Emmi v. First-Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of Lewiston and Auburn,
336 F. Supp 629, 633–34 (D. Me. 1971).
235. United States v. Gulf P.R. Lines, Inc., 492 F.2d 1249, 1251 (1st Cir.
1974).
236. In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 515 F.2d 94, 95 (1st Cir. 1975).
237. Id. The appeal was denied as the court found that the defendants
who were the subject of the pendent jurisdiction order failed to apply to the
First Circuit after initial certification and later recertification. Id. Court
held defendants had lost opportunity to take an interlocutory appeal and
were not entitled to writ of mandamus to compel transmission of record by
clerk of district court. Id. at 96.
238. United States v. Kennebec Log-Driving Co., 399 F. Supp. 754, 760
(D. Me. 1975), aff’d, 530 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1975).
239. Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 138
(D.N.H. 1975).
240. In re Maritime Service Corp., 515 F.2d 91, 93 (1st Cir. 1976).
241. Id. The appeal was sought under a writ of mandamus and was
denied. Id. at 92. The Court noted that “[s]ince 1292(b) permits certification
only when the district court is ‘of the opinion’ that an otherwise
nonappealable order involves “a controlling question of law as to which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion . . . ’ we would have, absent
more, little difficulty denying the petition as wholly inappropriate.” Id.
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dispute as to right to certain public
benefits. 242
Order that Jones Act and general
maritime law provided for cause of
action despite coverage under the
Puerto Rico Workmen’s Accident
Compensation Act. 243
Order finding lack of jurisdiction
pertaining to alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty of employer trustees
of union trust fund. 244
Order dismissing complaint made
under Warsaw Convention to extent
claimed jurisdiction or liability
without fault. 245
Order that resolution was
unconstitutional as to taking of land
related to resort development
project near Puerto Rico’s unique
thermal springs. 246
Order requiring nonresident bonds
to secure costs, expenses and
attorney’s fees in action for personal
injuries. 247
Order certifying class of potential
woman academic employees in sex
discrimination suit. 248
Order denying motion to dismiss

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

× 249

×

242. Theriault v. Smith, 523 F.2d 601, 602 (1st Cir. 1975).
243. Manual Caceres v. San Juan Barge Co., 520 F.2d 305, 306 (1st Cir.
1975).
244. Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 846–47 (1st Cir. 1975).
245. In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154, 158 (D.P.R. 1975), aff’d, Hernandez
v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976).
246. Hotel Coamo Springs, Inc. v. Hernandez-Colon, 426 F. Supp. 664,
675 (D.P.R. 1976).
247. Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 142–43 (1st
Cir. 1976).
248. Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 553 F.2d 714, 715 (1st Cir. 1977).
249. Id. The Lamphere Court also noted that previous attempt to seek
review of class certifying order by writ of mandamus was denied. Id.
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based on res judicata in aviation
matter. 250
Order denying motion to dismiss
and to certify class involving claims
against federal officers who
purported conspired to intercept
and read first class letters. 251
Order in FTCA action denying
motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. 253
Order striking portion of complaint
seeking damages for physical and
mental suffering under ADEA. 254
Order requiring fishing vessel
owner to post bond under
Limitation of Vessel Owner’s
Liability Act. 255
Order denying request to amend
complaint to add nonfederal tort
claim against third party. 256
Order regarding pension
termination insurance under
ERISA. 257
Order denying motion to dismiss for

×

×

× 252

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

× 258

×

250. Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de Avaiacion, C. Por A., 556
F.2d 611, 612 (1st Cir. 1977).
251. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 387 (D.R.I. 1977), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978).
252. The ruling of the District Court was affirmed in part and reversed in
part on the merits. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 150–51, 154.
253. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659,
668 (D.N.H. 1977) (noting that “ruling may be at odds with the traditional
concepts of jurisdiction and find that the final resolution of this issue will
‘materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.’”).
254. Vazquez v. E. Air Lines, Inc., No. 74-1042, 1997 WL 58 (D.P.R. Nov.
21, 1977), rev’d, 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978).
255. In re Boat Camden Inc., 569 F.2d 1072, 1074 (1st Cir. 1978).
256. Ortiz v. U.S. Gov’t, 595 F.2d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
257. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 630 F.2d 4, 6 (1st
Cir. 1980).
258. Id. The court noted that “the issue is one of first impression
involving the interpretation of the [ERISA].” Id.
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failure to pay costs in maritime
action. 259
Order compelling disclosure of
confidential sources and
information derived from sources in
defamation action. 260
Order finding lack of jurisdiction
pertaining to Tort Claims Act and
Tucker Act. 262
Order on motion to dismiss as to
Sherman Act challenge to statute
governing issuance of liquor license
and issue of state action
immunity. 263
Order denying motion to dismiss sex
discrimination claim for failure to
state claim as allegations of
discrimination and as policy applied
equally to all. 264

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

× 261

×

×

× 265

259. Span E. Airlines, Inc. v. Digital Equip., Corp., 486 F. Supp. 831, 834
(D. Mass. 1980).
260. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 584
(1st Cir. 1980).
261. Id. The order was vacated in part and remanded. Id. at 599.
262. Armor Elevator Co., Inc. v. Phoenix Urban Corp., 493 F. Supp 876,
889 (D. Mass. 1980), aff’d, 655 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1981).
263. Grendel’s Den v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761, 762 (D. Mass. 1980),
rev’d, 662 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1981).
264. Sandler v. E. Airlines, Inc., No. 77-3897-MA, 1980 WL 262, at *1 (D.
Mass. Oct. 16, 1980), remanded by, 649 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1981).
265. In Sandler, First Circuit initially permitted appeal and then
reconsidered. 649 F.2d at 20 (1st Cir. 1981). According to the Court,
“[h]aving reviewed the parties’ briefs and heard oral arguments, we are no
longer satisfied that the question certified ‘involves a controlling question of
law’ and that an immediate appeal ‘may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation’ a required by Section 1292(b).” Id. The Court
gave “four considerations” as to its holding: (1) that it was “disinclined to
address a certified question which may only be hypothetical”; (2) issue
certified would be controlling only if denial of employment was due to policy
against hiring married person of both sexes, but if the complaint claimed to
allege policy was pretext, and if correct, the certified question would neither
arise or control; (3) further development of facts would be necessary before
there could be proper question of law; and (4) certification from the EEOC
was based on theory that policies discriminated against women not men, and
as such, the “anti-male theory” has neither been argued or decided below. Id.
at 20–21.
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Order denying motion to dismiss
second amended complaint
asserting claims under 301(a) of
Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 with issue including whether
Union had standing and conflict of
interest. 266
Order denying motion to dismiss
based on contention of lack of state
action in civil rights claim. 267
Order allowing United States to
intervene in suit involving claim
that juveniles confined in industrial
school and camp were being denied
constitutional rights. 269
Order striking affirmative defenses
inconsistent with ruling that
Congress acted within authority to
extend coverage of Fair Labor
Standards Act to domestic
employees. 271
Order in denying motion to dismiss
as to viability of cause of action
under section 36(b) of the
Investment Company. 273

×

×

×

×

× 268

× 270

× 272

× 274

266. Locals 2222 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. New England Tel. & Tel.
Co., No. 77-1912-MA, 1980 WL 268 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 1980).
267. Rendell-Baker v. Kuhn, 641 F.2d 14, 28 (1st Cir. 1981) aff’d 102 S.
Ct. 2764 (1982).
268. See id. (consolidating the appeal of two cases involving the same
issue. First Circuit held that claims that First Amendment rights were
violated when former school staff members were discharged failed due to lack
of state action. The result was one case affirmed and one reversed.)
269. Santana v. Collazo, 89 F.R.D. 369, 373 (D.P.R. 1981).
270. Id. at 374. (suggesting that “should any of the parties wish to appeal
this Order, such appeal shall be certified by this Court pursuant to § 1292(b);
however no stay of the Court’s proceeding will be granted.”).
271. Marshall v. Cordero, 508 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D.P.R. 1981).
272. Id. at 326 n.4 (referencing that “[s]hould Defendant wish to appeal
this decision an Order, such appeal shall be certified by this Court pursuant
to [1292(b)].”).
273. Kehoe v. Smolar, No. 73-1506-MA, 1982 WL 1574 (D. Mass. Mar. 3,
1982).
274. Id. at *2 (finding that the applicable law to the issue was “settled” in
the Circuit and that is was not “a case where other Circuits are badly split
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Order denying motion to dismiss
holding that Federal Water
Pollution Act did not provide
exception to general rule granting
jurisdiction. 275
Order pertaining to decision of
Secretary of Health and Human
Services denying disability
benefits. 276
Order in commercial contract as to
goods litigation taking jurisdiction
and granting relief from default
judgment entered by another
court. 277
Order denying motion to remand
and concerning jurisdiction. 278
Order disqualifying counsel. 279
Order denying cross-motions for
summary judgment on grounds that
plaintiff had not established
acquisitive prescription with
plaintiffs’ rights subject to tax
liens. 280
Order on motion to dismiss ruling
that claim under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
could proceed where discrimination
charges file with EEOC more than

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×
×

×
×

×
×

×

and the First Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to reach a decision that would
provide some guidance.”). The court also stated that “what would hasten the
termination of this case would be concerted efforts by the parties to prepare
for trial or some other accommodation rather than preparing and continuing
flood of motions.” Id.
275. United States v. Puerto Rico, 551 F. Supp. 864, 869 (D.P.R. 1982),
aff’d, 721 F.2d 832 (1st Cir. 1983).
276. Torres v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 677 F.2d 167, 170 (1st
Cir. 1982).
277. Indian Head Nat’l Bank of Nashua v. Brunelle, 689 F.2d 245, 252
(1st Cir. 1982).
278. Pueblo Int’l, Inc. v. De Cardona, 562 F. Supp. 843, 847 (D.P.R. 1983),
aff’d, 725 F.2d 823 (1st Cir. 1984).
279. Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 851 (1st Cir. 1984).
280. Rodriquez v. Escambron Dev. Corp., 556 F. Supp. 703, 712 (D.P.R.
1983), aff’d 740 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1984).
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60 days prior to suit; they cited
employer to state agency in timely
fashion; and they complied in good
faith with all pre-litigation
procedural requirements of act even
assuming statute transferring
enforcement authority was
unconstitutional. 281
Order denying request to vacate
attachment and holding that
exercise of jurisdiction over
corporation based on maritime
attachment of corporation’s credits
in Puerto Rico did not violate due
process. 282
Order denying motion to dismiss
based on failure to state a claim in
action by private accounting firm
against state officials seeking
damages for defamation,
interference with contract and
violation of process and First
Amendment rights. 283
Order in cases under Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934 refusing to adopt
“sale of business doctrine.” 285
Order in maritime in in rem action
seeking to compel U.S. Marshal’s to
proceed against vessel for unpaid

×

×

×

× 284

×

×

x

x

x

x

281. Lopez v. Bulova Watch Co., 582 F. Supp. 755, 765–66 (D.R.I. 1984).
282. Trans-Asiatic v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 963 (1st Cir. 1984).
283. McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 1984).
284. Id. at 76 n.1 (noting error in granting permission to appeal the Court
pointed out that they “would not normally allow an appeal from a denial of a
motion to dismiss, and, with the benefit of hindsight, [they] admit [their]
error in doing so in this case. [They] continue to adhere to the view that
interlocutory certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) should be used sparingly
and only in exceptional circumstances, and where the proposed immediate
appeal presents one or more difficult and pivotal questions of law not settled
by controlling authority”).
285. Crownair Systems Inc. v. Wolf, 598 F. Supp. 1478, 1481 (D.P.R.
1984).

WEIGANDFINALWORD[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/2/2014 1:24 PM

237

DISCRETIONARY INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

wages without prepayment of
custodial and insurance expenses. 286
Order pertaining to Hague
Convention. 287
Order invalidating six month spenddown period in Medicaid dispute. 288
Order denying motion for summary
judgment based on dispute over
which statute of limitations period
applied in racial discrimination
claim under Title VII. 289
Finding following trial that
university discriminated against
women on class wide basis in rank
placement, at hire, salary, at hire,
and annual compensation but not as
to promotion of tenure. 290

×
×

×

×

×

× 291

× 292

286. P.R. Drydock & Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Motor Vessel Lisa Del
Caribe, 746 F.2d 93, 94 (1st Cir. 1983).
287. Boreri v. Fiat S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting
district court’s denial of certification under § 1292(b) and rejecting effort to
have issue reviewed by mandamus).
288. Hogan v. Heckler, 597 F. Supp. 1106, 1107 (D. Mass. 1984), rev’d,
769 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1985).
289. Hester v. City of Lawrence, 602 F. Supp. 1420, 1422 (D. Mass. 1985).
290. Chang v. Univ. of R.I., 606 F. Supp. 1161, 1279 (D.R.I. 1985).
291. According to the court in Chang:
This litigation has symptomtology which fairly cries out for the balm
of the statute: it presents an interleaved series of difficult and
pivotal questions of law as to which there is a dearth of controlling
precedent and as to which there is appreciable room for differences
of opinion. An immediate appeal from the class wide orders
contemplated hereby would have the salutary effect of resolving
some of these critical questions with a greater degree of finality.
And, such a process would in this court’s judgment both materially
advance, and reduce the costs of, the ultimate termination of the
legal battle. To permit the second and third stage proceedings to run
their course, at enormous expense to the parties and to the judicial
system, with the grey eminence of appellate review lurking in the
wings, would run a thoroughly unacceptable risk of prodigal
wastefulness.
Id. at 1279–80.
292. Chang noted that First Circuit accepted interlocutory appeal but did
not make a decision on merits. 107 F.R.D. 343, 344 (D.R.I. 1985).
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Order denying motion to dismiss
pertaining to statute governing
forfeiture. 293
Order in breach of contract action
denying motion for summary
judgment which motion based on
statute of limitations and statute of
frauds, and in particular finding
that duress exception to statute of
limitations applied, and involving
sister to Shah of Iran. 295
Orders pertaining to jurisdiction of
National Joint Adjustment Board 297
Order in contract action striking
affirmative defenses of usury and
dismissing usury based counterclaims. 298

× 294

×

× 296

×
× 299

293. United States v. Approximately 2,475,840 of Clean Unroasted Coffee
Beans, 608 F. Supp. 288, 291 (D.P.R. 1985).
294. Court stated that the question was one of “first impression” in circuit
and thus would “be willing to amend this order to certify this matter to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit pursuant to [Section
1292(b)] if claimant so requests.” Id. at 292.
295. Plandjian v. Pahlavi, 614 F. Supp. 1569, 1576 (D. Mass. 1985). In its
certification, the district court expressed the view that it did not think the
duress exception applied to statute of limitations but deferred to another
district court judge that so held. Id.
296. The First Circuit initially gave permission to appeal then later
vacated the order and dismissed the appeal. Palandin v. Pahlavi, 782 F.2d
313, 313–14 (1st Cir. 1985). In so holding, it doubted that a substantial
ground for difference of opinion existed as to the recognition that duress could
toll the statute of limitations under Massachusetts law. Also, the Court
found that the certified issue of the “extent” of the duress exception “is a
classic example as to what is not to be raised by intermediate appeals.”
According to the Court, “it resembles a ‘sufficiency of the evidence’ claim—the
kind of claim which an appellate court can better decide after the facts are
fully developed. The fact that appreciable trial time may be saved is not
determinative, for such would often be true of interlocutory appeals.” Id. at
314.
297. Sheet Metal & Air Conditioning Contractors Ass’n of Bldg. Trades
Emp’rs Ass’n v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local Union 17, 619 F.
Supp. 1073, 1084 (D. Mass. 1985).
298. Bank of N.Y.v. Hoyt, 108 F.R.D. 184, 189 (D. Mass. 1984).
299. Id. at 189. The Court issued a detailed opinion setting out its
analysis in denying certification. It stated in part:
Common sense teaches that, if employed in a casual or desultory
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KNOWN DENIALS OF CERTIFICATION OR PERMISSION
TO APPEAL: 1971–1985 300
Number of Cases
No Available Opinion
No Discussion
Rote Recitation of Criteria
Meaninfgul Measurable Decision
No Controlling Question of Law
No Difference of Opinion
No Likelihood of Early
Termination
Need More Facts
Other

11
3
1
1
7
5
1
2
1
2 301

KNOWN GRANTS OF CERTIFICATION: 1971–1985
Number of Cases
No Available Opinion
No Discussion
Rote or Cursory Discussion
Meaningful or Measurable
Discussion

43
17
1
21
3

fashion, interlocutory appeal may not only fail materially to advance
the termination of a case but may prolong it. he cure prescribed by
an overeager petitioner may well produce symptomatology far more
virulent than any which would otherwise infect the record. The case
law recognizes such hazards, and counsels toward restraint where
(as here) such auxetic and/or deleterious results are in prospect.
Id.
300. The chart includes decisions where more than one reasons for the
denial or permission to appeal were identified.
301. One decision relied in part that the question certified was potentially
only a hypothetical. Sandler v. E. Airlines, Inc., No. 77-3897-MA, 1980 WL
262 *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 16, 1980), remanded by, 649 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1981).
The other noted that appellant had failed to take timely appeal from
certification and recertification. In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 515 F.2d
94, 95 (1st Cir. 1975).
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GRANTS OF CERTIFICATION AND APPEAL: RESULTS
ON MERITS-1971–1985
Number of Cases Granting
Certification and Permission
to Appeal
Revered
Affirmed
Reversed in Part Affirmed in
Part
Merits Unknown

28
9
16
2
1

1986–2000
→ Fifty cases where district court addressed certification
request;
→Twenty-one cases where district court decisions denied
certification;
→Twenty-nine cases where district court decisions
granted certification;
→Twenty-one First Circuit decisions where permission to
appeal granted;
→Eight cases where permission to appeal was either
denied, not pursued, or not known.
Of the fifty cases identified, the most common issues were
preemption (seven cases) and personal jurisdiction (five cases)
followed by statute of limitations or accrual (four cases) and
immunity (two cases). Of the twenty-one cases where the First
Circuit permitted the appeal, nine were affirmed on the merits,
nine reversed on the merits, one was both affirmed and reversed
in part and two were unknown. As to the twenty-one cases where
the district court denied certification, the most common basis for
the denial was failure to demonstrate that interlocutory appeal
would materially advance an earlier termination of the litigation
(i.e., eight cases), followed by lack of controlling question of law
(five cases) and the lack of a substantial difference of opinion (five
cases). One district decision made reference to the concern of
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overburdening the appellate court 302 and another to the concern
that the issue would become moot. 303 Two decisions made
reference to age/advanced stage of the litigation, 304 three decisions
generally referenced the lack of “exceptional circumstances,”305
Section 1292(b)’s “circumscribed authority,” 306 and the lack of any
reason to depart from the final judgment rule.
The only First Circuit decision to address Section 1292(b) in
any detail during this period was Plandjian v. Pahlavi. 307 There,
the First Circuit held that its earlier grant of permission to appeal
was “improvident.” 308 The issue in the case concerned the extent
to which there was a duress exception to statutes of limitations
under Massachusetts law. The First Circuit held that it
“doubt[ed]” there were substantial grounds for a difference of
opinion as to whether duress could constitute an exception “in
some conceivable circumstances.” 309 It likewise held that while
the issue of whether Massachusetts would recognize the principle
of duress as tolling the statute constitutes a “controlling question
of law,” the issue of such an exception’s “extent” was deemed “a
classic example of what is not to be raised by intermediate
appeals.” 310 The court explained that such an issue was deemed
to require a fully developed factual record and emphasized that
whether appreciable trial time would be saved was not
determinative as to the propriety of an interlocutory appeal.
Of the twenty-one cases where both the district court and the
First Circuit permitted the appeal, five orders pertained to
jurisdictional questions; four pertained to preemption rulings;
four involved statutory interpretation issues; three
rulings
involved patent cases; two involved questions of standing; two
involved constitutional challenges to a statute; two involved
302. Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., No. CIV. 92-508-JD, 1994 WL
421112, at *2 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 1994).
303. Cummins v. EG&G Sealol, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 64, 69 (D.R.I. 1988).
304. Zane S. Blanchard & Co. v. PSPT, Ltd., No. Civ. 92-660-SD, 1995 WL
17211933, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 20, 1995).
305. McCarthy v. Azure, No. CIV. 92–523–SD, 1994 WL 258316, at *1
(D.N.H. Jan. 24, 1994).
306. Zane, 1995 WL 17211933 at *1.
307. 782 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1986).
308. Id. at 314.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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statute of limitations issues; and the remainder were significantly
diverse and involved the attorney-client privilege, Eleventh
Amendment immunity, entitlement under the AFDC, and the
applicability and enforceability of an arbitration clause. As to
certification denials, the matters were equally diverse including
orders pertaining to a forum selection clause, forum non
conveniens, statute of limitations, standing under the Clayton Act,
ERISA coverage, including ERISA preemption as well as an order
pertaining to a bond.
The specific orders and action taken between 1986 and 2000
are as follows:
TYPE OF ACTIONS AND ORDERS: 1986–2000
-The following key accompanies the table below with regard to
the disposition of the corresponding cases in the tableCD
CG
AP
AD
MA
MR

Cert. Denied
Cert. Granted
Appeal Permitted
Appeal Denied
Merits Affirmed
Merits Reversed

Order
Order dismissing complaint
seeking declaratory judgment
that statute governing emergency
commitment of alcoholics was
unconstitutionally vague. 311
Order providing that section of
Securities Act did not preclude
assertion of liability based on the

CD

CG
× 312

AP

×

×

AD

MA

MR

×

311. Id. at 1480–81.
312. The Court in Donahue stated that “when one considers the critical
importance of the statute interlocutory review would surely redound to the
benefit of not only the parties but also the citizenry.” Thus, it likewise left the
decision of whether or not to pursue the appeal to the discretion of the
plaintiff. Donahue v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, 632 F. Supp. 1456, 1481
(D.R.I. 1986).
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common law notions of apparent
authority. 313
Order denying motion to dismiss
rejecting argument that claim
against cigarette manufacturer
was preempted by Cigarette
Labeling an Advertising Act. 314
Order in breach of
contract/termination action
denying motion to dismiss and
pertaining to issue of diversity
jurisdiction and “principal place
of business.” 315
Order denying motion to dismiss
based on abstention in action
requesting declaration that
Puerto Rico legislation
authorizing creation of medical
malpractice insurance syndicate
unconstitutional. 316
Order holding that
Environmental Protection Agency
was not barred from imposing
sanctions under Clean Air Act
although EPA failed to act on
proposed revisions to state
implementation plan within four
months of submission of
revision. 318
Order granting motion to amend
complaint to permit former

×

×

×

×

×

×

× 317

×

×

×

313. In re Atl. Fin. Mgmt, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1986).
314. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1179–80 (D. Mass.
1986), rev’d, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
315. Topp v. CompAir, Inc., 814 F.2d 830, 839 (1st Cir. 1987).
316. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Garcia, 680 F. Supp. 476, 477
(D.P.R. 1988).
317. Court found in a conclusory fashion that the criteria of Section
1292(b) was met and stated that it was up to the parties to take immediate
appeal “if such is desired.” Id. at 486.
318. United States v. Arkwright, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1231, 1232–33
(D.N.H. 1988).
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employer to assert state tort
claim of retaliatory discharge. 319
Order pertaining to discovery in
which any party in multi-party
litigation was required to provide
list of exhibits five days before
deposition implicating work
product rule. 320
Order denying motion for
summary judgment premised on
defense that motor vehicle
product liability action based on
lack of air bags or other “passive
restraint” was preempted by
National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act and Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards. 322
Order in tortuous interference
action denying motion to dismiss
premised on lack of personal
jurisdiction. 323

×

× 321

×

×

×

×

× 324

319. Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 64, 70–71, 73 (D.R.I.
1988). The Court in Cummins issued a detailed decision as to the reasons
denying certification. It also noted that the motion to certify was “unusual”
because it sought to have certified “a purely state law issue.” Id. at 70. The
Court felt certification was unnecessary as it was “likely” to certify the
retaliatory discharge issue to state court, if necessary, after trial. Id. It was
likewise concerned that the First Circuit, upon certification, may well opt to
certify the issue back to state court causing only further delay. Id. at 71.
According to the Court: “Section 1292(b) must not be used to transmogrify a
legitimate cause of action into a legal pinball bouncing from court to court in
the federal and state judicial systems.” Id. at 71.
320. In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007,
1021 (1st Cir. 1988).
321. Id. at 1010 (noting that “although the call is close” the work product
issue was “sufficiently novel and important, and the circumstances
sufficiently out of the ordinary” to justify review under Section 1292(b)).
322. Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 419 (1st Cir. 1988).
323. Thompson Trading Ltd. v. Allied Lyons PLC., 124 F.R.D. 534, 538
(D.R.I. 1989).
324. Id. (noting that since motion to dismiss “concerns only 2 of 5
defendants, an interlocutory appeal could not ‘materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.’”
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Order denying motion to remand
where defendants had removed
action based on assertion it was
preempted by ERISA and 301 of
the Labor Management Relations
Act. 325
Order limiting penalties for
permit violations under Clean
Water Act to violations taking
place after complaint was filed. 326
Order dismissing copyright
infringement action against state
based on Eleventh Amendment
Immunity. 327
Order in civil rights action
denying motion to dismiss in part
based on rejection of qualified
immunity defense. 328
Order pertaining to summary
judgment ruling pertaining to
accrual of civil RICO action. 329
Order in breach of contract and
tortuous interference action
denying motion to dismiss based
on lack of personal jurisdiction. 331

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

× 330

×

×

×

×

325. Dowd v. N.E. Tel. & Tel. Co., CIV. A. No. 89-705, 1989 WL 118795,
at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 1989).
326. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 634, 648
(D. Mass. 1989).
327. Lane v. First Nat. Bank of Bos., 687 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D. Mass. 1989),
aff’d, 871 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the issue was “sufficiently
novel and important”).
328. Fisichelli v. City Known As Town of Methuen, 884 F.2d 17, 18 (1st
Cir. 1989).
329. Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 917 F.2d 664, 669 (1st Cir. 1990).
330. Court refused to address certified questions beyond the civil RICO
statute of limitations accrual issue which it affirmed. It stated review was
proper under Section 1292(b) “because the circuits are divided about the
proper answer to this question and because the district court has followed the
minority view.” Id. at 655. The other “certified” questions could not be
reviewed as the application to the First Circuit was not made within 10 days
after entry of the order. Id. at 668–69.
331. Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 708 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1989),
rev’d, 893 F.2d 459, 461 (1st Cir. 1990) (deciding on the merits that, they
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Order in product liability action
from denial of motion to
reconsider denial of motion to
dismiss and summary judgment
which had been based on statute
of limitations and issue of release
and effect on joint tort-feasor. 332
Order in discrimination action
denying reconsideration of
evidentiary ruling denying
motion to qualify witnesses as
experts. 333
Order denying motion to dismiss
which held that False Act
amendments of October 27, 1986
applied retroactively to relator’s
suit in qui tam action. 334
Order in securities litigation on
motion to dismiss which was
allowed in part and denied in
part, concerning whether
complaint stated claim for
securities fraud or racketeering
and misrepresentation in
prospectus. 335
Order denying motion to remand
state action against American
Red Cross and concerning issue of
original federal jurisdiction over
suit involving transmission of the

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

were “[i]mpressed by the issue’s novelty and importance; and by the district
court’s concern, [they] allowed an interlocutory appeal”).
332. Smith v. Morback Indus., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 484, 490 (D.N.H. 1990).
333. Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D.P.R. 1990)
(reasoning that the “district court must consider the relative advantages and
disadvantages of immediate appeal in light of the guidelines provided in the
statute”).
334. See United States ex rel. La Valley v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., No.
86-236-WF, 1990 WL 112285, at *1, *6 (D. Mass. July 30, 1990) (providing a
detailed analysis of applicable criteria).
335. Miller v. New Am. High Income Fund., 755 F. Supp. 1099, 1110 (D.
Mass. 1991), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, Lucia v. Prospect St. High Income
Portfolio, 36 F.3d 170, 177 (1st Cir. 1994).
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HIV virus through the
transfusion of tainted blood. 336
Order denying motion to dismiss
based on the assertion of
preemption under the Longshore
and Harbor Worker’s
Compensation Act. 337
Order on cross motions for
summary judgment holding that
state statute prohibiting
imposition of late fee on credit
card customers could be enforced
despite claim of preemption
under Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980. 338
Order that section of Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act limiting
judicial review of actions of FDIC
as receiver did not preclude
jurisdiction over suit brought
prior to FDIC’s appointment as
receiver. 340
Order on cross motions for
summary judgment holding that
the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts was not in

×

×

×

×

× 339

×

×

×

×

×

336. See S.G. v. Am.Nat’l Red Cross, 938 F.2d 1494, 1495 (1st Cir. 1991)
overruled by Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 506 U.S. 247 (1992)(granting the
permission to appeal “[b]ecause of the importance of the jurisdictional issue
presented, especially in light of the increasing litigation concerning the
transmission of HIV virus through the transfusion of tainted blood”).
337. Barnard v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 975 F.2d 919, 921 (1st Cir. 1992).
338. Greenwood Trust Co. v. Comm. of Mass., 971 F.2d 818, 831 (1st Cir.
1992).
339. Id. at 821 (noting that certification was accepted “in light of the
pivotal importance and broad commercial consequence of the questions
presented” and that its belief in the importance of the questions presented
was “validated to some degree by the outpouring of amicus briefs, some
favoring appellant’s position and some opposing it.”).
340. Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1155 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining
that “because of the importance of the jurisdictional question, and its
unsettled nature, we accepted appellate jurisdiction” under Section 1292(b)).
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compliance with section 302(c) of
the Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act. 341
Order on motion to dismiss
finding claim under Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act
untimely. 342
Order in civil rights action on
motion for new trial granting new
trial based on violation of local
rule occurring when court
permitted alternates to deliberate
with jurors without consent of the
parties. 343
Order providing that ERISA
provision authorizing Secretary to
bring civil action to enjoin
violations or to obtain other
appropriate relief did not create
cause of action against nonfiduciaries. 344
Order on motion to compel
arbitration holding that
arbitration clause in bill of lading
enforceable despite provision of
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
prohibiting lessening of carrier’s
obligation. 346
Order denying motion to dismiss
tort suit and ruling that National

×

×

×

×

×

× 345

×

×

×

×

×

×

341. See Avanzato v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 91-30205-F,
1992 WL 88008, at *1, *8 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 1992)(granting Commissioner
the option to seek Section 1292(b) certification but such certification was
never sought).
342. I.D. by E.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 788 F. Supp. 634, 640
(D.N.H. 1992).
343. Cabral v. Sullivan, 757 F. Supp. 107, 112 (D. Mass. 1991), rev’d in
part and aff’d in part, Cabral v. Sullican, 961 F.2d 998, 1003 (1st Cir. 1992)
(noting provisions of Section 1292(b) are flexible).
344. Martin v. Johnson, 813 F. Supp. 122, 126 (D.N.H. 1992).
345. Id. at 122.
346. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 516,
532 (1995).
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Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
bars the family of person who
accepted award under act from
bringing tort suit. 347
Order denying motion for
reconsideration as to ruling
exempting accidental death and
dismembership policy from
ERISA coverage because policy
was not endorsed. 348
Order finding that employees had
standing to sue for treble
damages under Clayton Act. 350
Order denying application for
judgment by default. 352
Order in tortuous interference
action denying motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. 353
Declaratory order as to rate
applicability being within
primary jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce
Commission. 354

249

× 349

× 351

×
×

×

× 355

347. Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994).
348. Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., No. 92-508-JD, 1994 WL 421112, at
*1 (D.N.H. Aug. 11, 1994).
349. Id. at *2 (declining to certify “the real difference of opinion is
between defendants’ and the court’s application of the law to the particular
facts of this case”).
350. Ashmore v. Ne. Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 438, 439
(D. Me. 1994).
351. Id. at 440 (holding that “an interlocutory appeal would cause a delay
of at least several months in the pretrial development of this case and, even if
the issue of standing under the Clayton Act were resolved in full, no factual
issue or litigants would be removed from the case.”).
352. MacFarlane v. McKean, No. 92-614-SD, 1994 WL 255311, at *1
(D.N.H. June 8, 1994).
353. McCarthy v. Azure, No. 92-523-SD, 1994 WL 263682, at *1–2
(D.N.H. Jan. 25, 1994).
354. United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. Chadwick’s of Bos. Ltd., 900 F. Supp. 557,
560 (D. Mass. 1995).
355.
Id. at 567 (stating that “[b]ecause of the complicated issues of
jurisdictional law implicated by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and
because of the possibility of conflicting decisions in this case by two different
United States Courts of Appeals, the findings and orders contained herein

WEIGANDFINALWORD[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2014 1:24 PM

250 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:183
Order denying motion to dismiss
on forum non conveniens. 356
Order on summary judgment
denying assignee of inventor
amendment of patent. 358
Order in tort suit as to
manufacturer denying motion to
dismiss premised on lack of
standing. 359
Order pertaining to issue of
whether disability policy procured
though fraud and
misrepresentation. 360
Order on motion for partial
summary judgment granting
motion on grounds that alleged
activities were non-infringing of
patent. 361
Order in civil rights action
dismissing amended complaint
for failure to comply with
limitations imposed by court. 363
Order in libel action denying
motion to dismiss seeking

× 357
×

×

× 362

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

are particularly appropriate for” interlocutory review).
356. Zane S. Blanchard & Co. v. PSPT Ltd., No. 92-660-SD, 1995 WL
17211933, at *1–2 (D.N.H. Sept. 20, 1995).
357. Id. at *1 (rejecting a request to certify due to the “clearly
discretionary nature of the challenged ruling, the age of the litigation, and
the circumscribed authority vested in” the court under § 1292(b)).
358. Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 29 F.3d 1570, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (noting conclusively that “order meets the statutory criteria” and that
“district court and parties which for the court to address the relevant issues”).
359. Pacamor Bearing, Inc., v. Minebea Co., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 347, 361
(D.N.H. 1995) (noting that while standing is generally a controlling question
of law, certification is not appropriate in this case as it is not dispositive).
360. Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 892 F. Supp. 299, 300 (D. Mass.
1995).
361. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 7 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’d,
122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (1st Cir. 1997).
362. Id. at 9 (granting certification due to “novelty and complexity” of
pertinent statutory provision.
363. Veale v. Town of Marlborough, No. 92-355-SD, 1995 WL 136902, at
*1 (D.N.H. Mar. 22, 1995).
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dismissal based on lack of
personal jurisdiction. 364
Order on motion for partial
summary judgment dismissing
discrimination claims as time
barred. 365
Order in fraud action against
cigarette manufacturers denying
motion to dismiss asserting lack
of personal jurisdiction. 366
Order denying cigarette
manufacturers action to enjoin
enforcement of Massachusetts
tobacco ingredient and nicotine
yield reporting law based on
preemption under Federal
Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act. 367

251

×

×

×

×

×

364. Faigin v. Kelly, 923 F. Supp. 298, 299 (D.N.H. 1996) (showing
California residents who brought libel action against New York residents who
co-authored book that contained allegedly defamatory statements with thirtysix copies sold in N.H.).
365. Iglesias v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 918 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D.P.R.
1996).
366. Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 977 F. Supp. 545, 549 (D.P.R.
1997) (denying the request for certification). The Barreras Ruiz Court stated:
[W]e find there is no substantial ground for difference of opinion: Far
from dubious, we view the preliminary retention of jurisdiction over
the Tobacco Institute as the only possible just action at this stage.
Given the indisputably indistinguishable nature of the evidence for
jurisdiction and that for the ultimate case, we see no possibility that
the Court of Appeals would better resolve this issue then welldeserved further discovery and reassessment would. Because this
matter cannot be resolved with any greater delay, appellate review
would actually delay the ultimate termination of this litigation.
Id.
367. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 957 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D. Mass.
1997) (stating that preemption “is an issue naturally appropriate for
interlocutory [review]” and “that it would be going too far to say there is no
substantial grounds for any difference of opinion on such a case of first
impression”), aff’d, 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that Massachusetts
statute not expressly or impliedly preempted by either Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act or Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health
Education Act of 1986).
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Order denying motion to dismiss
and ruling that patent infringer’s
antitrust claim was not a
compulsory counterclaim. 368
Order in banking action denying
motion to dismiss seeking
dismissal under forum non
conveniens. 370
Order granting a motion to
dismiss in part holding that
district was not immune from
punitive damages under Title
IX. 371
Order dismissing federal
copyright and trade dress
infringement claims but not state
law claim for tortious interference
with contractual relations. 374
Order in franchise termination
action as to jurisdiction. 375

×

x 369

×

× 372

× 373

×

×

×

368. Longwood Mfg. Corp. v. Wheelabratore Clean Water Systems, Inc.,
954 F. Supp. 17, 19 (D. Me. 1997).
369. Id.
370. Standard Quimica De Venez. v. Cent. Hispano Int’l, Inc., 189 F.R.D.
202, 208 (D.P.R. 1999) (stating that “it is true that unsettled jurisdictional
questions are often appropriate for interlocutory review. Yet it is doubtful
whether the issue here should be viewed in jurisdictional terms, given the
degree to which it is intertwined with the merits.”).
371. Canty v. Old Rochester Reg’l Sch. Dist., 54 F. Supp. 2d 66, 68 (D.
Mass. 1999).
372. Id. at 75 (granting certification and noting that “the stark division
among the six circuits to consider Title IX’s preclusion of Section 1983 actions
certainly demonstrates a sufficient difference of opinion”).
373. Id. at 74.
374. Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d
82, 89 (D. Mass. 2000) (Ruling involves “no more than application of wellestablished law, recently clarified by a unanimous Supreme Court opinion.
Though a mistake is always possible, nothing in the rulings makes them
especially debatable.”).
375. Seahorse Marine Supplies, Inc. v. P.R. Sun Oil, 295 F.3d 68, 83 (1st
Cir. 2002).
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KNOWN DENIALS OF CERTIFICATION: 1986–2000 376
Number of Cases
No Controlling Questioned of
Law
No Difference of Opinion
No Likelihood of Early
Termination
Age of Litigation
Other

21
5
5
8
2
5

GRANTS OF CERTIFICATION AND APPEAL: RESULTS
ON MERITS-1986–2000
Number of Cases Granting
Certification and Permission
to Appeal
Reversed
Affirmed
Reversed in Part Affirmed in
Part
Merits Unknown

21
9
9
1
2

2001–2012
→Forty-seven cases where district court addressed
certification request;
→Twenty-six cases
certification request;

where

district

→Twenty-one cases
certification request;

where

district

court
court

denied
granted

→Eleven First Circuit decisions where appeals were
granted;
→Seven cases where First Circuit denied request to
appeal;
→Three cases either were not pursued or not known.
376. The chart includes decisions where more than one reasons for the
denial or permission to appeal were identified.
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Slightly less than half of the total petitions were granted
(twenty-one of forty-seven or 44%) with the First Circuit only
agreeing, at best, with the district court slightly more than half
the time to permit the appeal (i.e. eleven times out of twenty-one
(52%)). Of the eleven known grants of appeals by the First
Circuit, seven were reversed on the merits (with two additional
not known and two affirmed). The petitions for certification, as in
the past, continued to vary with statutory interpretation or
construction, a leading general category among the petitions that
were granted.
As to district court denials of interlocutory petitions, six of
the twenty-five denials were rote reference to the statute or its
criteria with no discussion or application to the facts; eleven
based on no substantial difference of opinion; six were based on a
determination of no controlling question of law; seven relied on
the lack of material advance termination of the litigation with two
found to be untimely and one lacking any meaningful argument
by counsel. The First Circuit denied one request to appeal,
despite certification by the district court, holding that there was
no grounds for difference of opinion as two other district court
decisions had made similar holdings. It was reasoned that there
was no evidence that granting the appeal would materially
advance termination of the litigation since the remaining claims
would otherwise continue based on the same underlying facts.
The specific cases and orders between 2001 and 2012 are
summarized on the following page.
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TYPES OF ACTIONS AND ORDERS: 2001–2012
-The following key accompanies the table below with regard to
the disposition of the corresponding cases in the tableCD
CG
AP
AD
MA
MR

Cert. Denied
Cert. Granted
Appeal Permitted
Appeal Denied
Merits Affirmed
Merits Reversed

Order

CD

Order requiring witness to submit
to in camera inspection for
purposes of disclosure of tip. 377
Order on Motion for Protective
Order holding that the Federal
Employees Liability Reform and
Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(Westfall Act) precludes a
complainant from contesting
United States Attorney’s refusal to
certify that a defendant employee
of the federal government was
acting within the scope of his office
or employment. 378
Order finding no preemption under
Airline Deregulation Act of state
law trot claims. 380

×

CG

×

A
P

AD

MA

MR

× 379

×

377. Lovejoy v. Town of Foxborough, No. Civ. A.00-11470-GAO, 2001 WL
1756750, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 2, 2001) (denying certification as not involving
a controlling question of law “but rather a decision about what weight to
accord to the legitimate interests on both sides in order to strike an
appropriate balance under all the circumstances”).
378. Booten v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 2d 227, 228 (D. Mass. 2002)
(noting that “the question of whether a tort plaintiff may contest the
government’s refusal to certify is a difficult one”).
379. Id.
380. Stone ex rel Estate of Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d
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Order in wrongful death action
denying dismissal of claim against
Palestinian Authority based on
asserted immunity. 381
Order holding that Clayton Act
permits worldwide service of
process on alien corporate
defendants in antitrust case. 382
Order in civil RICO action that
party’s voluntary disclosure of
privileged material to the
government resulted in waiver of
protections of privilege to third
party. 383
Order denying summary judgment
motion made based the expiration
of the statute of limitations. 384
Order on summary judgment on
issue of whether plaintiff harbor
pilot was employee of Puerto Rico
Ports Authority. 386

×

×

×

×

×

× 385

×

×

28, 47 (D. Mass. 2002).
381. Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 228 F. Supp. 2d 40, 50 (D.R.I.
2002) (stating that “certification should be reserved for unsettled questions of
law” and that denials of motions to dismiss are not the proper subject for
Section 1292(b) review).
382. In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., No. MDL
1532, 2004 WL 1571617, at *1 (D. Me. Apr. 20, 2004) (noting that court’s
agreement to certify issue based on defendants’ commitment that if their
appeal is unsuccessful they will accept the outcome of any rulings litigated in
this matter).
383. In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 8, 9 (D.
Mass. 2004) (although waiver of privilege ruling was “serious to the conduct
of the litigation” there was no ground for difference of opinion as every
Circuit but the Eight has ruled that voluntary disclosures to the government
destroys attorney-client privilege).
384. In re Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y. Premium Litig., 299 F. Supp. 2d 4, 5
(D. Mass. 2004).
385. One line ruling by First Circuit. First Circuit Judgment Dated April
22, 2004.
386. Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth., 267 F. Supp. 174, 177 (D.P.R. 2003)
(presenting the issue of whether PRPA was a licensing board rather than
plaintiff’s employer and noting that while other circuits have decided that a
licensing body is not an employer under the ADEA., the question had not
been addressed by First Circuit), rev’d, 369 F.3d 579 (1st Cir. 2004).
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Order on motion for judgment on
the pleadings or in alternative
summary judgment as where it
was asserted that the Medicare Act
and associated procedures were
exclusive avenue of recovery by the
United States of Medicare
overpayments. 387
Order pertaining to whether
Workforce Investment Act
precluded claim. 388
Order denying summary judgment
on issue of whether a regional
diagnostic and treatment center
which treats only ambulatory
patients and has an emergency
room independent of a hospital is
subject to Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act. 390
Order denying motion to dismiss
claim seeking overtime and other
work related relief determining
that piers area was not part of a
federal enclave. 391
Order pertaining to accrual of
action under Class Action Fairness
Act. 392

×

×

×

×

× 389

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

387. U.S. v. Lahey Clinic Hosp. Inc., No. 03-10194-RWZ, 2004 WL
950448, at *1 (D. Mass. April 30, 2004), aff’d, 399 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005)
388. Caraballo-Seda v. Muncipality of Hormigueros, 395 F.3d 7 (1st Cir.
2005).
389.
Id. (determining that while the issue of whether the Workforce
Investment Act precluded a Section 1983 suit was a controlling question of
law, there were no grounds for a substantial difference of opinion of material
advance of termination of litigation and two other district court decisions that
had made similar holdings; the rest of the claims would otherwise continue
based on the same underlying facts).
390. Rodriquez v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of P.R., 263 F. Supp. 2d 297, 298
(D.P.R. 2004), rev’d, 402 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005).
391. Torrens v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Inc., 396 F.3d 468, 469 (1st Cir.
2005).
392. Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 182 (D. Mass. 2005)
(noting that “case law to date demonstrates marked litigant confusion and
disagreement.”), aff’d, 424 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005).
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Order that BOP regulations
delaying plaintiff inmates transfer
to a CCC were contrary to the
BOP’s statutory mandate and thus
invalid. 393
Order pertaining to whether
ERISA preempted state law
claims against insurer, insurance
agency and insurance agent
stemming misrepresentations. 394
Order concluding that “defendant
had met the first prong of the
Faragher/Ellerth defense
inasmuch as defendant had
provided employees antidiscrimination policy which
includes grievance procedure
known to plaintiff.” 396

×

× 395

×

×

×

×

393. Muniz v. Winn, 462 F. Supp. 2d 175, 183–84 (D. Mass. 2006), rev’d,
Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008). The District Court stated that
the “issue cries out for authoritative, prompt, precedential resolution in the
First Circuit.” According to the court:
The judges in this District are divided; the inmates at FMC-Devens
are apparently all apprised of this issue an form pleadings circulate
freely among them, producing repetitive, time consuming, and only
marginally productive litigation. What is more, habeas litigation is
unfortunately slow and certain of these inmates stand to lose
individual rights while these cases wend their ways through the
courts. In this case, moreover, the relevant administrative agency,
the BOP, has a legitimate and important role in interpreting and
enforcing its organic statutory framework. It is clear that there
exists a tangible, and presumably good faith, disagreement between
certain of the district judges and the BOP, both branches have
coequal powers of statutory interpretation, absent precedential
guidance.
Id. at 183–84.
394. Miara v. First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 68, 70 (D.
Mass. 2005).
395. Court in Miara noted that its ruling on the merits was “based on
legal precedents in this circuit and on other circuits and “seems apparent to
this Court,” but that “[n]evertheless, the rationale of this court serves as
persuasive authority only, and , as [counsel] indicated binding direction from
the First Circuit would clarify and put to rest the existing and abiding
confusion in this circuit in this area of law.” Id. at 68.
396. Perdomo-Rosa v. Corning Cable Sys., No. 02-2114(DRD), 2006 WL
695818, at *1 (D.P.R. Mar. 15, 2006).
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Order denying motion to dismiss
action brought by Securities and
Exchange Commission that was
based on misappropriation theory
of insider trading. 397
Order denying request to dismiss
complaint which request based on
exhaustion requirements under
Prison Litigation Reform Act. 398
Order denying motion to dismiss
asserting lack of jurisdiction and
particularly “whether health care
providers have enforceable rights
under [] section 1983.” 400
Order denying in part and
granting in part motion for
summary judgment in class action
suit under section 1983. 401
Order in product liability action
granting motion to dismiss based
on lack of personal jurisdiction. 402
Order denying motion to dismiss in
qui tam claim for fraudulent
payment and conspiracy to defraud
under False Claim Act. 403
“Order pertaining to requirements
necessary for food producer to
execute bond posted by distributors

×

×

259

×

× 399

×

×

×

×

× 404

×

397. SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
398. Beltran v. O’Mara, No. Civ. 04-CV-071-JD, 2006 WL 240558 (D.N.H.
Jan. 31, 2006).
399. Id. at *4 (finding that certification would not materially advance
termination of litigation as remaining would proceed based on the same
underlying facts).
400. National Medical Care, Inc. v. Rullan, No. Civ. 04-1812(HL), 2006
WL 130766, at *1 (D.P.R. Jan 13, 2006).
401. Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 451 F. Supp. 2d 253, 256 (D. Me. 2006).
402. Amburgey v. Atomic Ski USA, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-149-GZS, 2007 WL
2028954, at *1 (D. Me. July 10, 2007).
403. United States ex rel McDermott v. Genentech, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d
289, 290 (D. Me. 2007).
404. Id. at 291–92 (noting that while the issue was subject to conflicting
opinions in other circuits, existing First Circuit precedent left no grounds for
difference of opinion).
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in relation to distributors previous
action against food producer which
had been dismissed for
jurisdictional issue.” 405
Orders pertaining to trustee
process and particularly “whether
property alleged to belong to Iran
sought to be attached under”
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act;
whether foreign sovereign
immunity applied under Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act; and
whether “commercial use”
exception of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act applied. 406
Order in labor dispute denying
request for conditional
certification. 408
Order denying motion to dismiss
which motion was made on
grounds of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the first-to-file
bar of the False Claims Act. 409
Order denying in part motion to
dismiss and for summary
judgment on counterclaims in antitrust and patent infringement
action including tying
counterclaim. 410

×

× 407

×

×

×

405. Kellogg USA, Inc. v. B. Fernandez Hermanos, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d
56, 57–58 (D.P.R. 2007).
406. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 541 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421 (D. Mass.
2008).
407. The First Circuit ruled that legal question of immunity was “bound
up with factual question of ownership” and that “we prefer to resolve the
legal question (if necessary) after ownership has been ascertained.” Rubin v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 08-8020 (1st Cir. August 11, 2008).
408. O’Donnell v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 173, 181 (D.
Mass. 2008).
409. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., No. 07-11618PBS, 2008 WL 2778808, at *1 (D. Mass. July 15, 2008).
410. Hypertherm, Inc. v. Am. Torch Tip Co., No. 05-cv-373-JD, 2008 WL
1767062, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 15, 2008).
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Order in contract based action
denying motion for summary
judgment where motion was based
on alleged failure of plaintiff to
satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement for subject matter
jurisdiction. 411
Order pertaining to whether antitrust claims preempted by federal
securities laws. 412
Order in declaratory judgment
action involving insurance
coverage dispute granting partial
summary judgment but denying
insurer’s request for repayment of
amounts advanced to insured
newspaper in libel lawsuit. 413
Orders on summary judgment in
action brought by inmates
challenging validity of amendment
to Massachusetts constitution
disqualifying currently
incarcerated inmates from voting
in all Massachusetts elections with
order denying judgment on the
pleadings on inmate’s Voting
Rights Act claim but granting
judgment on Ex Post Facto
claim. 414
Order in declaratory judgment as
to state regulation action
pertaining to issue preclusion. 416

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

× 415

×

411. Colon v. Blades, No. 07-1380, 2009 WL 3347627, at *1 (D.P.R. Oct.
14, 2009).
412. Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, 597 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213 (D. Mass.
2009).
413. Emp’r’s Reinsurance Corp. v. Globe Newspapers Co., No. 03-10388,
2006 WL 1738342, at *1, *6 (D. Mass. June 20, 2006), vacated, 560 F.3d 93
(1st Cir. 2009).
414. Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2009).
415. Id. at 45 (affirming and reversing in part).
416. Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, Nos. 06-07 S, 06-69 S, 2009 WL
578541, at *1 (D.R.I. Mar 4, 2009) (stating that “the issue transcends ‘garden
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Order denying motion for
judgment on the pleadings as to
issue of whether Title II excluded
employment discrimination
claims. 417
Order pertaining to issue of
whether airline action for fraud
against ticket purchasers was
preempted under Airline
Deregulation Act. 419
Order denying motion to remand
and issue of ERISA preemption 420
Order in environmental pollution
action denying request to
disqualify counsel. 421
Order denying motion to dismiss
grand jury indictment. 422
Order pertaining to issue of
whether whistleblower provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act extends
protection to non-public affiliated
in mutual fund industry. 423

× 418

×

×
×

×
×

×

×

variety legal argument’ . . . [and] would materially advance the ultimate
resolution of the case, limit piecemeal adjudication of issues and conserved
judicial resources”).
417. Skinner v. Salem Sch. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188 (D.N.H. 2010).
418. Court stated in denying certification:
“[Q]uestion [was] not so difficult and unsettled as to warrant the
exceptional use of an interlocutory appeal. [While the issue] has
divided federal courts of appeal[, First Circuit] has discussed issue at
length in dicta and its analysis all but compel he conclusion the
court reached which is the clear majority view. . . ”
Id. at 194 (internal citation omitted).
419. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Gregory, 716 F. Supp. 2d 79, 90–91 (D.
Mass. 2010).
420. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Kossen, 746 F. Supp. 2d 375, 385
(D.R.I. 2010).
421. Southwire Co. v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., No. 03-1100, 2010 WL
446593, at *1 (D.P.R. Feb. 1, 2010).
422. United States v. Rivera-Mercado, 683 F. Supp. 2d 168, 171 (D.P.R.
2010).
423. Lawson v. FMR LLC., 724 F. Supp. 2d 167, 168 (D. Mass. 2010),
rev’d, 670 F.3d 61 (2012).
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Order finding violation of
Massachusetts Tips Law. 424
Order pertaining to issue of
whether “presumption of
prudence” applied to ERISA plan
management claim. 426
Order finding the first-to-file bar
inapplicable to kickback claims. 428
Order under criminal sentencing
statute (2255) as to (a) ruling
addressing whether under
McDonough proof of actual or
implied bias in jury and (b)
whether the ruling and order
under section 2255 is “civil” for
purposes of 1292(b). 430
Order in securities litigation
denying motion to dismiss with
issue being whether a class action
filing by plaintiff union which
lacked standing to sue as to the
offering had an effect of tolling
applicable statute of limitations. 431

263

× 425
× 427

× 429
×

× 432

× 433

424. Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 789 F. Supp. 251, 251 (D. Mass.
2011).
425. Court, in denying certification, relied upon the fact that “the only
remaining issue to be decided was damages” and that certification is “hen’s
teeth rare.” Id. at 252 (internal citation omitted).
426. Kenney v. State Street Corp., No. 09-10750, 2011 WL 4344452, at *6
(D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2011).
427. Court, in denying certification, noted that First Circuit has preferred
awaiting record development to adopting the “presumption of prudence” rule
and that certification would not “materially advance termination of
litigation.” Id. at *5–6.
428. United States ex rel. Banigan v. Organon USA, Inc., No. 07-12153,
2012 WL 3929822, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2012).
429.
See id. (denying certification, court stated issue did not raise a
controlling question of law).
430. United States v. Sampson, No. 01-10384, 2012 WL 1633296, at *1 (D.
Mass. May 10, 2012).
431. Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset
Acceptance Corp., 894 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150, 156–57 (D. Mass. 2012).
432. See id. at 158 (noting that neither the First Circuit nor the Supreme
Court had addressed the issue and that “resolution of the certified question
will conserve court, party, and non-party time and resources by clarifying
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Order dismissing federal
prosecutors as defendants in
section 1983 suit on grounds of
absolute or qualified immunity and
certain state defendants rejecting
theory of duty to intervene. 434
Order denying motion to dismiss
as to issue of sham litigation
exception to anti-trust immunity
for those engage in protected
activity. 435
Order in misrepresentation and
conspiracy/nuisance action denying
request to remand which motion
had been premised on lack of
complete diversity. 437
Order in FTCA action denying
application of judgment bar under
to section 2676 to companion
Bivens claims. 439

×

× 436

×

×
438

×

proper scope of action”).
433. Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset
Acceptance Corp., 894 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D. Mass. 2013), reconsideration
denied Nov. 29, 2012.
434. Widi v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. 1:11-cv-00113, 2011 WL 5877543,
at *3–4 (D. Me. Nov. 23, 2011).
435. P.R. Tel. Co. v. San Juan Cable, LLC., No. 11-2135, 2012 WL
4052018, at *4 (D.P.R. Sept. 13, 2012).
436. See id. (denying certification and noting that although First Circuit
had yet to address the issue, “the Second and Ninth Circuits noted to share
similar position and no [real] disagreement between the circuit courts of
appeals exists.”).
437. Fayard v. Ne. Vehicle Servs., Inc., 533 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2008).
438. Court noted that district court had certified denial of remand order
but that its (First Circuit) review would be based on jurisdiction resulting
from accompanying denial of preliminary injunction with the review of the
denial of the request for remand properly reviewable “as an ancillary matter.”
Id.
439. Donahue v. Connolly, 890 F. Supp. 2d 173, 188 (D. Mass. 2012).
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GRANTS OF CERTIFICATION AND APPEAL: RESULTS ON
MERITS-2001–2012
Number of Cases Granting
Certification and Permission
to Appeal
Reversed
Affirmed
Reversed in Part Affirmed in
Part
Merits Unknown

11
6
3
1
1

VII. DISCRETIONARY PAUSE AND OBSERVATION

A. Lack of Publicly Available Data As To Treatment
One of the most striking observations of the review is the lack
of publicly assessable data as to judicial treatment. There is no
repository where with the number of petitions or their treatment
are publicly available. Given both the discretion underlying the
statute and the lack of review of any denials, disclosure is needed
in regards to publication of both the substantive decisions and the
statistics as to frequency and dispositions. The lack of openness
or availability only thwarts public understanding, judicial
accountability, and prevents any meaningful evaluation of this
aspect of appellate adjudication.
B. Potential Underutilization
The lack of published or accessible data as to certification and
requests for permissions to appeal under Section 1292(b) is
surprising. 440 The U.S. Administrative Office of the United States
Courts keeps very detailed statistics as to all decisions of every
federal court and as to individual caseloads, including the nature
440. It would appear that this data was once officially tracked and
published. See Martin Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in
the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 109 n.106 (1975) (citing J. COUND,
J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES & MATERIALS 872
(1968)).
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and types of cases filed and disposed of in any given year. This
tracking and data has been eased and readily assimilated through
the electronic filing and docketing. Similarly, each district court
and circuit court departments publish and provide annual reports
that also set forth substantial statistics as to the caseload and
work of the courts for any given year. It would not seem difficult
to include the Section 1292(b) certification requests to the district
courts and petitions to the circuit courts as well as their
dispositions in the yearly statistical publications. The survey
reveals 164 total petitions under Section 1292(b) since the
statute’s inception. As mentioned, this is likely measurably lower
than the actual number given because many petitions and
appellate rulings are not reported or did not make their way into
the Westlaw database. Even so, the true number of petitions is
still likely relatively small compared to the number of cases,
courts and pending appeals. Indeed, related statistics seem to
bear this out. For instance, in a study of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit there were a total of 117 Section 1292(b)
petitions between October 1995 and 2010. 441
Another
commentator estimated that only about 100 appeals under Section
1292(b) take place in a year. In 1999, Judge Weinstein indicated
that in the ten years between 1989 and 1999, there were only 138
certified interlocutory orders under Section 1292(b) in the Second
Circuit out of the more than 40,000 total appeals. 442 Using the
First Circuit survey above there were approximately fifty-seven
1292(b) certification orders for the same period, which shows the
circuit as substantially less busy than the Second Circuit in terms
certification orders.
While there is no central repository for certification requests
under Section 1292(b) made to the district court or upon
presentation to the circuit courts, certain statistics are kept in the
circuit courts as part of the Federal Court Management Statistics.
For instance, the Federal Court Management tracks the number
of “applications for interlocutory appeals which were terminated.”
The reported figures (which exclude the Federal Circuit) ranged

441. Hess et al., supra note 1, at 764.
442. Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, 71 F. Supp. 2d
139, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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between 217 to 347 per year between 1995 and 2010. 443 Although
not specifically explained in the table, the “applications for
interlocutory appeals” would appear not to be limited to Section
1292(b) but include any basis for the interlocutory appeal
including under Section 1291(a), bankruptcy orders, collateral
orders, class action related orders and orders pertaining to refusal
to enforce arbitration clauses to list a few. According to the same
statistics, between 1992 and 2012, the First Circuit disposed of
approximately 132 “applications for interlocutory review.” 444 In
yet another ad hoc statistical compilation, between 1985 and 1989
(fiscal years), there were fifty 1292(b) appeals filed in the First
Circuit with only eleven transmitted onto the regular appellate
docket. 445
The small number of Section 1292(b) appeals may be due to
the long-standing admonition that the statutory exception to the
final judgment rule is to be used “sparingly” and “only in
exceptional cases,” despite the absence of any such language in
the statute itself. 446 It has likewise been thought to be a result of
the perception that district judges are reluctant to certify issues as
it “increases the opportunities for reversal and ‘invites delay and

443. See Judicial Facts and Figures Archive, UNITED STATES COURTS (Jan.
5, 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFacts
AndFigures/JudicialFactsAndFigures_Archive.aspx.
The
number
of
“applications for interlocutory appeals terminated” for the years 2000–2010
were as follows (excludes Federal Circuit): 2000=280; 2001=252; 2002=250;
2003=356; 2004=295; 2005=198; 2006=309; 2007=347; 2008=292; 2009=334;
210=346. Id.
444. The Management Statistics did not have interlocutory review
statistics for the First Circuit for the years 2001, 2002, 2004 or 2005. Federal
Court Management Statistics: Courts of Appeals (2005), UNITED STATES
COURTS (Jan. 5, 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov /viewer.aspx?
doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa2005.pl (select “First Circuit” from drop-down menu, then
on page two). They were also provided based on an average as a “per
judgeship” estimated basis. See also Horton, supra note 12, at 980 (citing
Diane B. Bratvold, How to Get Heard: Practical Advice on Interlocutory
Appeals, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 2010, at 35 (noting based on the
Management Statistics that “in 2009 the federal court system received
approximately 334 [certification requests] which represented two (2) certified
request for each of the 167 circuit judges in contrast to the 50,564 pending
appeals nationwide.”).
445. Solimine, supra note 10, at 1175, Table 1a.
446. Horton, supra note 12, at 980–81
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circuit interference.’” 447 In fact, a number of commentators have
asserted that 1292(b) interlocutory review is under-utilized 448 and
criticized allowing district courts to certify as opposed to just the
circuit courts to play the gate-keeping role.
C. No Apparent District Court Predisposition
Although the above survey likely under-reports the total
number of petitions, it does provide a measurable sampling of
what is published and accessible. This sampling, in turn, reveals
a 65% allowance rate of interlocutory petitions by the district
court (107 of 164 total petitions) and a 64% allowance by the First
Circuit as to district court permissions (69 of 107). The relatively
high percentage rate of district court grants of Section 1292(b)
certifications is supported by, at least, one circuit study.
Specifically, it has been noted that between 2008 and 2010, the
reported grant rate of Section 1292(b) petitions was 72% in the
Sixth Circuit.449 In a sampling of a ten-year period in the Second
Circuit, it was noted that out of the 138 total district court
certifications the Second Circuit granted 93 of them (i.e. 67%).450
The relatively high percentage rate of grants cuts against the
reported view that district courts are reluctant to grant such
447. Robertson, supra note 161, at 762; see also Horton, supra note 12, at
981 (“The district judge has ‘strong incentive to refuse certification; when the
judge chooses to certify, the judge is conceding that the questions is a
troubling one, and thus, worthy of appellate attention and possible
reversal.’”) (quoting Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion:
Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 266
(2001)).
448. Horton, supra note 12, at 979–82 (discussing and noting
commentators who have stated that Section 1292(b) is underutilized). At
least one judge in a district court within the First Circuit has openly cited his
reluctance under Camacho’s “hen’s teeth rare” admonition to grant 1292(b)
certification requests stating “after 24 years as a judge in this circuit I cannot
recall another occasion which I willing to make a 1292(b) certification.”
Lawson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 168.
449. See Bruce A Khula, Can We Appeal That Now? Discretionary
Interlocutory Appeal At the Sixth Circuit, LEXOLOGY (May 4, 2012),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=72cdaade-7ef0-45b6-ac3b637055f0fb84. Cf. Solimine, supra note 10, at 1174 (stating that acceptance
rate of certified orders under 1292(b) in the 1960s was approximately 50%
and for certain years in the 1980’s 35%).
450. Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, 71 F. Supp. 2d
139, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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petitions due to concern of inviting reversal or unwarranted
interference. 451
Further, the above statistics, skewed as they may be as to the
actual number of petitions and denials, do demonstrate that a
substantial percentage of the certifications and permitted appeals
have resulted in a reversal (including at least in part) as to the
merits of the underlying order. Particularly, between 1959 and
2012, out of a total of sixty-nine reported cases where both
certification and permission to appeal were granted twenty-eight
resulted in reversals, thirty-three in affirmances, four
affirmed/reversed in part, and four merits unknown. This
amounts to a 46% reversal or reversal in part (thirty-three out of
sixty-nine) rate as to interlocutory appeals, a fairly hefty figure
and is above the reversal rates for civil cases appealed after a final
judgment. The reversal rate may be a reflection of the fact that
many such issues are of first impression. Another theory is that
the discretionary system of review influences circuit courts to
limit acceptances to those case or issues “presenting obvious and
un-burdensome errors and intolerable probable errors.”452
Nonetheless, it remains that one of the purposes of Section
1292(b) interlocutory appeals is to alleviate costs and hardship of
litigation through earlier resolution of a controlling question of
law. Thus, a reversal of the substantive ruling, even in part,
451. The Federal Circuit statistics reveal a 34% grant rate by the Federal
Circuit of 1292(b) certifications for the years 1995–2010. For the fiscal years
1966 through 1968, the number of petitions and allowances by the circuit
courts were as follows: 68/36 (1966), 80/41 (1967), and 128/58 (1968). Redish,
supra note 442, at 109 n.106 (citation omitted).
452. Glynn, supra note 7, at 251–52. Also, “the courts are likely to grant
review of obvious and unburdensome errors because such errors, by
definition, will be easy to spot and easy to correct.” Professor Glynn also
argues that the converse is true:
[C]ourts are less likely to grant review when determining whether
there is probable error is difficult or where correcting such error will
be burdensome. In such circumstances, the court will have to invest
more time to determine whether the order contains probable errors
and then would have to expend significant time and resources
correcting any such error. Such discentives are troubling because
district courts are more likely to make errors when legal issues or
application of legal principles are difficult and they need greater
guidance in such areas.
Id. at 242
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before expenditure of resources on the entire litigation cannot be
downplayed and is the very purpose behind the exception to the
final judgment rule. Even where the merits are affirmed, there is
finality in that the controlling legal question has been resolved,
providing firm guidance to the parties.
D. Not Limited to “Big-Complex” Cases
The review of the types of actions and orders also
demonstrates that it is difficult to specifically pigeon-hole or
categorize for purposes of identifying those that are more likely to
be certified and those that are not. As to the general types of
actions, there was no discerning pattern. The types of actions
constituting three (3) percent or more of the total certified are as
follows:
Nature of Action
Anti-trust
Civil Rights
Constitution
Contract
Discrimination
ERISA
Labor
Maritime
Personal Injury/Wrongful Death
Securities

%
5%
5%
4%
4%
7%
7%
6%
8%
3%
6%

The remaining types of action were also diverse involving
aviation, environmental, employment, banking, and civil RICO
and prisoner disputes among others. Another type of issue is
statutory construction, which, while prevalent, were diverse with
over twenty-six different federal statutes subject to a certification
request. 453
453.
The referenced acts include the Clayton Act, ERISA, False Claim
Act, Clean Water Act, Airline Deregulation Act,
Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, Prison Litigation Reform Act, Class Fairness Act,
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Workforce Enforcement
Act, Federal Employees Liability Reform Act, Title IX, Title VII, Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act,
Securities Acts, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
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As to the types of orders, they are also varied although there
are certainly some general categories that were prevalent. For
instance, jurisdiction, preemption, immunity and statutory
construction rulings and issues are the more common subjects of
certification requests and grants. For the most part, however, the
circumstances are diverse and case specific. This is in keeping
with the flexibility and trial judge focus of Section 1292(b) in
which the particular circumstances of the case, its posture, and
particularities are considered as to the determination of the
advantages and disadvantages of interlocutory certification. 454 It
also debunks the position that only large or complex cases are, or
should be, considered for interlocutory review. The statute makes
no such distinction and the fundamental balancing between
hardship and efficiency underlying the tension between the
finality requirement and interlocutory appeal should be applicable
to all cases.

Act, Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, Labor
Management Relations Act, National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
EPA, Federal Water Pollution Act, Sherman Act, Rivers and Harbors Act,
and FCTA. See supra Chart: Types of Actions and Orders 2001–2012.
454. Indeed, it supports the Fifth Circuit’s early view of the statute:
Federal Judges from their prior professional practice, and more so
from experience gained in the adjudication of today’s complex
litigation, were acutely aware of two principal things. First,
certainty and dispatch in the completion of judicial business makes
piecemeal appeal as permitted in some states undesirable. But
second, there are occasions which defy precise delineation or
description in which as a practical matter orderly administration is
frustrated by the necessity of a waste of precious judicial time while
the case grinds through to a final judgment as the sole medium
through which to test the correctness of some isolated identifiable
point of fact, of law, of substance or procedure, upon which in a
realistic way the whole case or defense will turn. The amendment
was to give the appellate machinery..a considerable flexibility
operating under the immediate, sole and broad control of Judges so
that within reasonable time limits disadvantages of piecemeal an
final judgment appeals might both be avoided. It is that general
approach rather than the use of handy modifiers which may turn out
to be Shibboleths that should guide us in its application and in
determining whether the procedure specified as been substantially
satisfied.
Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697, 702–03 (5th Cir. 1961).
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E. No Dominating Statutory Factor With Over Reliance on “Rare
and Exceptional”
Out of the three statutory criteria for granting interlocutory
review (question of law, substantial difference of opinion, and
materially advance termination of the litigation), there was no
dominating factor as to the sixty-nine district court denials of
certification. The percentage breakdown between the statutory
factors in the district court denials is as follows:
Statutory Criteria
Controlling Question of Law
Substantial Grounds for Difference of Opinion
Materially Advance Termination of Litigation

%
25%
28%
30%

Seventeen percent of the district court decision denying
certification relied upon other reasons (in addition to or separate
from the express statutory criteria) which reasons included:
potential the requested issue would or could become moot, age of
litigation, concern of overburdening appeals court, need for
additional facts, and un-timeliness among others.
As set forth above, there is support that factors beyond those
in the statute, such as those suggested by Judge Weinstein, may
be considered. 455 However, the First Circuit has not adopted such
a view with only one district court decision within the First
Circuit referencing the Weinstein factors. Notably, most of these
factors seem to further inform the statutory criteria and thus may
well enhance meaningful decision-making. For instance, the time
an appeal would take, the age of the litigation, the potential for
mootness, and the effect of reversal on remaining claims all seem
to further elucidate and drill down as to the application of the
“may materially advance termination of the litigation” factor.
Moreover, whether there needs to be further factual development
and/or a more sufficient record would inform the controlling
question of law prerequisite.
Concern arises when considerations under the plume of
“discretion” creeps and strays from the statutory language and
intent. Given the myriad of possible considerations or factors and
455.

Nat’l Asbestos, 71 F. Supp 2d at 161.
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no method or means to weigh one against the other, it gives a
court the potential to justify any result. For instance, to the
extent resort is made to only allowing such appeals in large,
“complex” cases, 456 denying certification due to concern for
burdening the appeals court, 457 or evaluating under the generic
heading of “exceptional circumstances,” would not meaningfully
inform the statutory criteria and application to the particular
case. The result is a potential wayward looseness as well as an
unwarranted restrictive application of the statute.
The use and reference to “rarity” or “exceptional
circumstances” permeates a significant number of decisions in and
within the First Circuit. 458 Congress fully understood that any
exception to the finality rule should be rare and used this
understanding as the back-drop against which it debated whether
to carve out a statutory exception. It proceeded to do so premising
the exception on the three specific criteria set forth in the statute,
which criteria represents the necessary justification for exception
to the final judgment rule. The “discretion” under the statute is in
the leeway given to judges to apply the criteria to a particular case
or facts—not to further declare and decide the question under the
general auspices of “exceptional circumstances” or other
considerations not subsumed within the statutory factors. This
expansive discretion, when coupled with no review, results in
absolute, unfettered discretion with no limitations for principled
decision-making.
F. Cursory Analysis
A related concern is that a number of district court
certification decisions give only rote or cursory attention to the
statutory criteria. The survey revealed that more than half of the
district courts either lacked any written decision, merely made a
rote recitation of the statute and its criteria, or were otherwise
highly cursory in applying the statutory criteria to the facts and
circumstances. This practice is contrary to both the specificity of
456. See, e.g. Cummins v. Eg & G Sealol, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 64, 69 (D.R.I.
1988) (stating that “present action is not the type of complex, protracted
litigation for which Section 1292(b) certification is appropriate”).
457. Cummins, 697 F. Supp. at 67; Hoyt, 108 F.R.D. at 189.
458. See supra text accompanying note 166.
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the statute as to the governing factors and its intent to rely on the
district court’s specialized knowledge. Moreover, the cursory
reference to the statute without explanation and application of the
factors to the specific circumstances makes the court of appeals’
discretionary exercise more difficult and certainly adds little to
the coherent understanding of the discretionary contours.
The First Circuit has thus far not seemed too concerned about
the lack of specific application. In an early decision, it stated that
the “scant recital” of the statutory criteria does not require denial
of permission to appeal.459 A substantial argument can be made
that the First Circuit cannot fairly undertake its function under
1292(b) in determining whether to permit the appeal as that
function includes a review of the district court’s discretionary
application. While a denial of permission to appeal would be a
harsh and perhaps an unwarranted penalty upon the parties for
the trial judge’s action, a remand for explication of a cursory order
is certainly understandable. The remand would also be in keeping
with both the appellate court function as well as serve public
disclosure and understanding.
Similarly, there are virtually no First Circuit reported
decisions providing any detailed analysis as to its own discretion.
As to grants of permission, if reference is made, it is usually in a
brief reference in the decision on the merits that permission was
previously granted with sometimes a rote mention that the
question was of “importance” or “pivotal.” 460 As to First Circuit
denials of permissions to appeal, the First Circuit has issued a
handful of decisions. In at least three of these, it revoked its prior
permission. Otherwise, there are very little to no published or
accessible opinions with meaningful analysis.
459. Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 263 F.2d 887, 889–90 (1st Cir. 1959) (noting
the “scant recital” by the district court to Section 1292(b) certification criteria
but refusing to deny the application for leave and addressing whether leave
should be granted on its merits). Compare WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, §
3929, at 442 (“a district court order certifying a 1292(b) appeal should state
the reasons that warrant appeal as a guide to court of appeals consideration
on the petition for permission of appeal. Some generosity may be shown in
accepting a reasonable effort but a thoroughly deficient attempt may be found
inadequate to support appeal.”).
460. See, e.g., Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1992)
(“because of the importance of the jurisdictional question, and its unsettled
nature, we accepted appellate jurisdiction” under Section 1292(b)).
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Additionally, denial of permission to appeal is noteworthy
insofar as the First Circuit is opting to disagree with the district
court’s front-line assessment. Arguably, a certification by a
district court is inherently trustworthy given the trial judge’s
familiarity with the case and determination that it will be helpful
particularly as it is relinquishing control of the litigation and
subjecting its own order to reversal. The statute certainly
envisioned the right of the circuit court to disagree, yet more
published opinions setting forth the reasoning would serve to
further inform both the statute, accountability, and public
understanding. As one commentator has noted, “a circuit court
armed [with unfettered/unreviewable] discretion can ignore
reversible error for any reason, without comment and without
downstream consequences.” 461
G. No Mandamus Review
The survey revealed that the First Circuit has rejected any
effort to allow mandamus review of a district court denial of a
request for certification. 462 The result is that district court denials
of certification are un-reviewable even by mandamus. The
rationale is that to allow mandamus review is to bypass the dual
gate-keeping set out by the statute. However, neither the
statutory text nor its history supports the view that district court
discretion is unreviewable even by mandamus. Moreover, “[a]
district court with no incentive to seek review of its actions and
sheltered by unreviewable discretion is wide open to conscious and
unconscious abuse.” 463 If an order meets the statutory criteria yet
the district court denies the request, it would seem reasonable to
allow the appellate court to consider whether there was a clear
abuse of discretion. Otherwise, what results would be the
complete absence of any institutional restraint as well as the
disruption of the dual discretionary structure of the statute as the
district court effectively deprives the appellate court of
consideration.
461. Glynn, supra note 7, at 249.
462. See, e.g., In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 515 F.2d 94, 94 (1st Cir.
1975); In re Maritime Serv. Corp., 515 F.2d 91, 91 (1st Cir. 1975); Boreri v.
FIAT S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17, 17 (1st Cir. 1985).
463. Horton, supra note 12, at 984.
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

The absence of definitive statistics as to Section 1292(b)
treatment within the First Circuit makes it difficult to draw any
definitive conclusions. Based on the available data, the number of
certification petitions and grants are small suggesting that the
statute remains under-utilized. This under-utilization is
underscored by the relatively significant percentage of the
certifications and acceptances of certifications being reversed in
whole or in part on appeal as to the underlying merits. The
survey likewise reveals that a significant portion of interlocutory
decision-making is largely unpublished or publicly unavailable
and marked, in many instances, by rote recitation of the statutory
criteria with no meaningful application to the circumstances.
Moreover, to the extent available, the data does not reveal
any strong predisposition against allowing such appeals although
the First Circuit’s long-standing admonition that such appeals are
only available in “extraordinary” or “exceptional circumstances”
continues to pervade the case law. The available decisions, as a
whole, reveal that the certifications have not been limited to only
large or complex cases with certifications being granted in a
diverse range of cases and orders. Additionally, the decisions
show a seemingly healthy regard and application of the statutory
criteria on an individual case basis.
Lastly, the tracking and publicizing of the frequency of
certifications and their substantive treatment is needed in order
to fairly and better evaluate and understand interlocutory
appellate decision-making.
Interlocutory review remains a
difficult topic with Congress’s statutory grant of a discretionary
exception demanding openness, accountability, and principled
decision-making. Fundamental to the purpose of discretionary
interlocutory review under Section 1292(b) is to enhance error
correction and development of the law in individual cases and
based on an open, accountable, and meaningful and principled
application of the governing judicial discretion.

